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The paper analyzes the last three decades of debates about 
predatory pricing in US antitrust law, starting from the litera-
ture that followed Areeda and Turner’s 1975 landmark paper 
and ending in the beginning of this century, upon the Brooke 
1993 decision. Special emphasis is given to the game-theoretic 
approach to predation and to the reasons why this approach  
has never gained attention in the courtroom. It is argued that,  
despite their mathematical rigor, the sophisticated stories told  
by strategic models to demonstrate the actual viability of pred-
atory behavior fail to satisfy the criteria guiding court’s deci-
sions, in particular their preference for easy-to-apply rules. Pre-
dation cases are still governed by a peculiar alliance between 
Chicago-style price theory—which, contrary to game theory, 
considers predatory behavior almost always irrational—and 
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a Harvard-style attention to the operational side of antitrust 
enforcement.
[N]o mere fact ever was a match in economics for a consistent theory 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1987, 195)
Strategic theories of predatory pricing are pristine theoretical existence 
proofs (Elzinga and Mills 2001, 2493)
We shall take into account of the institutional fact that antitrust rules 
are court-administered rules. They must be clear enough for lawyers to 
explain them to clients. They must be administratively workable and 
therefore cannot always take account of every complex economic circum-
stance or qualification. (then-Judge Stephen Breyer in Town of Concord v. 
Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 1st Circuit, 1990, at 22)
I .  I n t r o d U c t I o n
At the Paul Samuelson Memorial Session during the 2010 AEA 
meeting, his colleague and friend Robert Solow recalled that, when 
challenged by a skeptical MIT engineer to state a proposition in eco-
nomics that was true but not obvious, Samuelson named the prin-
ciple of comparative advantage. What if he had answered “preda-
tory pricing”, i.e., the proposition that by lowering price a firm may 
harm both competition and consumers? Would that be a legitimate 
answer? 
That this proposition is far from obvious, and perhaps even coun-
terintuitive, is a no-brainer, given that a price reduction is normally 
deemed beneficial for consumers and a sign of healthy competition. 
But is it also true? This requires answering two different sub-questions. 
First, is it possible that a price may indeed be so low that it harms com-
petition and consumers? Second, is it possible that a profit-maximizing 
firm may rationally decide to charge such a low price? 
The MIT engineer’s reaction to Samuelson didn’t go on record, but 
even if he agreed that the comparative advantage principle was at 
the same time a true but not an obvious proposition, he might have 
added a third requirement, namely, that the proposition also had 
practical relevance (which in that very case it clearly had). In the case 
of predatory pricing (PP hereafter), and assuming affirmative answers 
to the previous sub-questions, this would amount to asking whether 
actual firms ever undertake predatory behavior, and thus, whether 
PP is a real world phenomenon or just a theoretical construct. This 
third query is as relevant as the previous two, because PP impinges 
upon a very concrete activity, like antitrust enforcement. Indeed, the 
century-long and ongoing debate over PP has always focused on all 
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three of the questions and on the different and sometimes conflicting 
answers that have been given throughout the years by economists, 
law scholars and judges.
This paper focuses on a recent phase of the debate, namely, from 
the publication of the highly influential Areeda and Turner in 19751 
to the beginning of this century.2 This is an extremely interesting 
period in all respects—theoretical, legal and historical—because it 
witnessed substantial changes in the way the three questions above 
have been answered in the US. In particular, I will cast light on 
the controversial relationship between strategic analysis and law 
enforcement. In a nutshell, when, how and why has modern game 
theory influenced the way US courts apply antitrust law to PP cases, 
if at all? I find this issue especially interesting not only per se, i.e., 
as a crucial ingredient to any historical reconstruction of the evolu-
tion of US antitrust law and economics, but more generally, because 
it may represent a useful lesson on the kind of features that make a 
formal economic model more likely to have an impact on the real 
world, via the reception of its main outcomes and prescriptions by 
judges and courts. This in turn may help foresee the future pattern of 
antitrust enforcement by US courts, including the Supreme Court, 
and especially on related subjects like the “hot” issue of predatory 
bundling.
The content of the paper is as follows. Section 1 contains a sum-
mary of the pre-1975 debate on PP. Section 2 deals with the first 
breaking point in our story, namely, Areeda and Turner’s 1975 pa-
per 3 and the reactions to it. Sections 3 and 4 cover the new game-
theoretic methodology and the related predation stories developed 
since 1982. Section 5 is dedicated to whether antitrust courts should 
follow the strategic approach to PP. Sections 6 and 7 deal with the 
second watershed in our narrative, namely, the Supreme Court’s 
Brooke decision that in 1993 effectively barred the strategic ap-
proach.4 Section 8 focuses on a recent, and largely unsuccessful, 
effort to renew the courts’ interest in strategic predation. Lastly, sec-
tion 9 takes on again the issue of why judges and courts have refused 
to “play the games” economists have bestowed upon them when 
investigating PP cases. 
1 P Areeda and D F Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act, 88(4) Harv L Rev 697–733 (1975).
2 I have covered the earliest phases of the debate in N Giocoli, When LOW is No 
Good: Predatory Pricing and US Antitrust Law (1950–1980), 18(5) Eur J Hist of Econ 
Thought 777–806 (2011).
3 Areeda and Turner, 88(4) Harv L Rev 697–733 (cited in note 1) (1975 article).
4 Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209 (1993).
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I I .  F r o m  t h e  “ w I l d S  o F  e c o n o m I c  
t h e o r y ”  t o  a  “ m e a n I n G F U l  a n d  
w o r k a b l e ”  r U l e
 “The predatory price-cutter is one of the oldest and most familiar 
villains in our economic folklore.”5 This folklore dates back to a 
couple of early 20th-century famous antitrust cases, Standard Oil 6 
and American Tobacco.7 Both cases featured a large firm, the villain 
in the story, charged for bringing prices down to a point where no 
competitor could survive, thereby becoming a monopolist. These 
and the other cases of PP fell either below the Sherman Act §2’s 
prohibition of monopolization or below the Robinson-Patman Act’s 
ban of price discrimination. 
For more than sixty years, US antitrust courts dealt with alleged 
predation episodes applying a common narrative captured by the fol-
lowing quotation: 
“The pre-1975 legal standard for predatory pricing hinged on 
two factors—unfair use of pricing power against new entrants  
or smaller firms, and protection of long run market competi-
tiveness viewed primarily in terms of market structure. Eco-
nomic efficiency was not specifically articulated as a legal policy  
goal. [. . .] Unfairness was emphasized under the Robinson- 
Patman Act, while structural competiveness was stressed under  
the Sherman Act.” 8
Thus, the two basic ingredients of any allegation of predatory behav-
ior had to be the existence of the structural requirement of market 
power and the intention of unfairly exploiting a price reduction to 
increase or consolidate that power. Market power and predatory in-
tent were the necessary features that antitrust courts had to detect 
in order to validate an accusation of predatory behavior. 
US courts went on for decades inferring predation from dubious 
proofs of market power and exclusionary intent. If both requirements 
were met, a per se prohibition applied, leading to the automatic con-
demnation of the alleged predator.9 No special consideration was 
5 R.H Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study 105 [1971] in Y 
Brozen (ed.), The Competitive Economy: Selected Readings 418–428 (General Learn-
ing Press, Morristown (NJ) 1975). 
6 Standard Oil Co of New Jersey v United States, 221 US 1 (1911).
7 United States v American Tobacco Co, 221 US 106 (1911).
8 J F Brodley and G A Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and 
the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 Cornell L Rev 755–6 (1981). 
9 W E Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern US Competition Law for Domi-
nant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 1 Columbia Business L Rev 
4, 43– 46 (2007).
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given to the relationship between price and cost, i.e., courts did not 
feel obliged to check whether the low price was still above the pred-
ator’s costs and thus whether the exclusionary effect—if any at all—
could only work against less efficient, higher cost rivals, for whom 
such a price might well be below cost. Condemning a firm for preda-
tory behavior in that case would, of course, generate an anti-com-
petitive and inefficient outcome. This would amount to protecting 
inefficient competitors, rather than competition. Worse than that, 
an excessively strict enforcement of PP violations would risk, to use 
modern Industrial Organization (IO henceforth) jargon, chilling gen-
uine competitive behavior, i.e., either condemning or discouraging 
normal competitive behavior in terms of welfare-improving price 
cuts. Indeed, the ghost of killing “good” competition has haunted 
the whole history of anti-PP enforcement and has been the underly-
ing argument in all of its critiques.  
The traditional legal approach was challenged in 1958 by a Chi-
cago scholar, John McGee, who set out to establish two simple re-
sults.10 First, that by applying standard price theory it was possible 
to demonstrate that the classic story of PP was untenable. Second, 
that a price-theoretic assessment of the factual evidence in the most 
famous PP case to date, the 1911 Standard Oil, demonstrated that 
the condemnation of Standard Oil for predatory behavior had been 
largely unfounded. McGee’s results laid the ground for the Chicago 
approach to PP, whose central idea—as in Robert Bork’s classic pre-
sentation11—has since been that profitable, below-cost pricing is at 
best a very infrequent, and probably impossible, business behavior. 
It follows that, in the words of another authoritative member of the 
Chicago School, “[a]ny attempt to administer a rule against predation 
entails a significant risk of condemning the outcome of hard compe-
tition. [. . .] If there is any room in antitrust law for rules of per se le-
gality, one should be created to encompass predatory conduct”12
Despite being essentially fact-based, the most influential part of 
McGee’s article was the theoretical one.13 What he and his genera-
tion of Chicagoans achieved was to establish price theory as the 
indispensable tool to check the validity of each story told to antitrust 
courts by either private plaintiffs or federal agencies. In the specific 
case of predation, price theory provided a couple of good reasons 
10 J S McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ) Case, 1 J Law and 
Econ 137–169 (1958).
11 See, for example, R H Bork, The Antitrust Paradox. A Policy at War with Itself 
ch 7 (Free Press, New York 1978).
12 F H  Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 (2) Univ of 
Chicago L Rev 336–337 (1981).
13 McGee, 1 J Law and Econ 137–169 (cited in note 10).
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why the usual stories were probably unsound. Firstly, the observa-
tion that the predator usually suffered greater losses than the prey 
made it necessary for any dominant firm entertaining predation to 
have a “long purse” at his disposal; on the other side, this also made 
it possible for any prey to resist predation thanks to the financial 
help of outside creditors or customers. Thus, no theoretical grounds 
could exist for a PP allegation, unless both the actual existence of 
the predator’s “deep pockets” and a specific reason for the prey’s 
impossibility of finding support in capital or product markets were 
explicitly proven. Secondly, high barriers to entry were also required 
to protect the predator’s recoupment phase from the possible arrival 
of new competitors or the re-entry of old ones. Again, the actual 
existence of these barriers had to be demonstrated if one wished to 
raise a convincing predation charge. Hence, price-theoretic analysis 
naturally led to an alternative story, one where PP was surely a rare 
and, perhaps, even an irrational strategy, so much so that price cuts 
and other allegedly predatory behaviors should always be considered 
as normal business practices, favorable to competition and market 
efficiency. 
Yet, US antitrust courts did not follow McGee. As it turns out, 
the 1958 paper, so often quoted and debated in burgeoning legal and 
economic literature, was completely ignored by courts dealing with 
actual PP cases.14 Lacking an explicit endorsement by the Supreme 
Court, no lower level court dared raise doubts over the traditional 
legal story and the attached per se prohibition. The loose standards 
of market power and predatory intent thus survived within a legal 
environment that traced the rationale for condemning PP, not in 
protecting competition or promoting efficiency, but rather in defend-
ing a vague notion of fairness in the marketplace (cf. Brodley and 
Hay).15 
That fairness, rather than efficiency, was the real yardstick was 
apparent in the 1967 Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Utah Pie, 
not without reason considered “the most anticompetitive antitrust 
decision of the decade”.16 Fairness dictated that defendants in that 
14 Hence the statement by leading IO economist Luis Cabral that “One can hardly 
underestimate the influence of McGee’s paper, both in economics scholarship and 
legal practice” is only half true. L Cabral, Predatory Pricing, in WA Darity Jr (ed), 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 428– 429 (Macmillan, vol 6 2ed 
2008).
15 Brodley and Hay, 66 Cornell L Rev 792 (cited in note 8).
16 Utah Pie v Continental Baking Co, 386 US 685 (1967). The negative judgment is 
in Bowman.  W S Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie 
Case, 455, in Y Brozen (ed), The Competitive Economy: Selected Readings, (General 
Learning Press, Morristown (NJ) (1975 [1967]).
nicola Giocoli 277
case had to be condemned as predators. Despite its being the leader 
in the Salt Lake City market for dessert pies, the single-plant and 
family-owned business Utah Pie deserved antitrust protection from 
the competition of the defendants, three big food conglomerates 
whose prices in Salt Lake City were lower than in the rest of the 
country, precisely because the latter were big food conglomerates, 
while the plaintiff was a family-owned business. In his dissent, Jus-
tice Stewart “. . . Utah Pie’s monopolistic position was protected 
by the federal antitrust laws from effective price competition”: the 
archetype of using antitrust law to defend a competitor, rather than 
competition.17 
Utah Pie is simply the most prominent example of how US courts 
continued to mishandle PP cases during the 1960s and 1970s, by 
still focusing on vague notions of “harm to competitors”, “preda-
tory intent” and “ruinous competition”, while paying little atten-
tion to efficiency issues. Another Supreme Court’s decision mirror-
ing the same legal attitude came one year earlier, in the Grinnell 
case.18 There, the Court declared that Sherman Act §2 violations 
called for two elements, namely, the possession of monopoly power 
and a conduct requirement, that is, “. . . the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or develop-
ment as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident.”19 Again, a vague notion like “willfulness” was 
called into play. Taking “willful” as synonymous of “intentional”, 
the application of the Grinnell dictum could only cause trouble to 
US courts, given the obvious circumstance that every firm willfully 
acquires or maintains its market power, that is to say, even when it 
does so via “business acumen” or a “superior product”.20 
Both Grinnell, with its focus on intent, and Utah Pie, with its 
emphasis on the defense of competitors rather than competition, 
were symptomatic of the distance separating that branch of anti-
trust law from proper economic analysis. To cap this trend came the 
Topco decision,21 where the Supreme Court penned an anathema 
against theoretical economics: “Should Congress ultimately deter-
mine that predictability is unimportant in this area of the law, it 
17 Utah Pie, 386 US at 706.
18 US v Grinnell Corp, 384 US 563 (1966).
19 Id at 570–1.
20 G J Werden, Next Steps in the Evolution of Antitrust Law: What to Expect from 
the Roberts Court  5(1) J of Competition L & Econ 49–74, 68–9 (2009).  D.C. Circuit in 
its Microsoft opinion has stated that the conduct element of the monopolization of-
fense should not relate to the defendant’s intent or state of mind. See US v Microsoft 
Corp, 253 F3d 34, 59 (DC Cir 2001).
21 United States v Topco Assocs Inc, 405 US 596 (1972).
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can, of course, make per se rules inapplicable in some or all cases, 
and leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of economic the-
ory in order to maintain a flexible approach.”22 This jurisprudential 
attitude led to a very high percentage of condemnations in preda-
tory cases at the level of federal courts. Until the mid-1970s three 
out of four PP trials at federal level were decided against the defen-
dant.23 In the same period, US federal agencies behaved aggressively 
against price cuts made by dominant firms. The Department of Jus-
tice did not hesitate to bring criminal charges against alleged preda-
tors during the whole of the 1960s. And in a 1977 public address 
Attorney General Griffin Bell could still announce his willingness 
to undertake criminal enforcement against PP aimed at destroy-
ing competitors.24 In short, the hostility of US antitrust courts and 
agencies against those price cuts made by dominant firms remained 
untouched well into the 1970s, as if McGee’s paper had never been 
written.25 
Yet, the 1958 paper had been written, and, after it, also a wealth of 
new economic literature. Here price theory had been applied either 
to strengthen McGee’s results or to defend the rationality of preda-
tory behavior in much sounder terms than those used by US courts, 
i.e., in terms of theoretically sophisticated stories where predation 
might well be profitable.26 In the eyes of those scholars who did be-
lieve that PP potentially was a serious offense, but who, at the same 
time, did not want the per se illegality of predation to turn into a 
de facto prohibition of every legitimate kind of price competition, 
the situation in the early 1970s was troublesome. On the one hand, 
we had a populist application of the PP offense by antitrust courts, 
founded upon very weak legal stories that had led to a list of wrong 
or at least very debatable rulings. On the other hand, we had several 
price-theoretic stories whose implications ranged from Chicago’s 
suggested abolition of the predatory offense to a higher risk of legal 
mistakes. The latter stemmed from the courts’ necessity “to ramble 
22 Id at 612 (emphasis added).
23 See P Bolton, J F Brodley and M H  Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory 
and Legal Policy, 88 Georgetown L J 2253 (2000). In an oft-quoted study, Koller The 
Myth of Predatory Pricing (cited in note 5) listed 123 federal PP cases, of which 95 had 
ended with the condemnation of the predator.
24 Quoted by Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing 45 (cited in note 5).
25 The first decision by a US court ever to mention McGee has been Matsushita 
Zenith Ratio Corp, 475 US 574 0986, on which see below, Section 7.
26 This literature is analyzed in Giocoli, 18(5) Eur J Hist of Econ Thought (cited 
at note 2). For a broader, though debatable, assessment of McGee’s influence see J A 
Dalton and L Esposito, Standard Oil and Predatory Pricing: Myth Paralleling Fact, 
38 Rev Industrial Org 245–266 (2011).
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through the wilds of economic theory” in order to verify the appli-
cability of sophisticated economic arguments.
The deadlock was broken by two Harvard law scholars, Donald F. 
Turner and Phillip E. Areeda, whose paper in the 1975 Harvard Law 
Review became an instant classic.27 Their main idea was that, rather 
than struggling to reconstruct the plausibility of one or the other 
predatory stories available in the literature, courts should apply a 
straightforward rule and draw the consequences of the result. In 
place of a complex and increasingly controversial doctrine, Areeda 
and Turner suggested a simple, bright-line principle, directly derived 
from basic price theory and discriminatory enough to allow the iden-
tification of real predatory behavior while avoiding the risk of chill-
ing genuine competition. In the authors’ words, “[i]n this paper we 
will attempt to formulate meaningful and workable tests for distin-
guishing between predatory and competitive pricing by examining 
the relationship between a firm’s costs and its prices.”28 Their rule 
aimed, on the one side, at giving specific content to the otherwise 
generic and arbitrary expression “below cost pricing” that was often 
encountered in PP cases and, on the other, at being “meaningful 
and workable”, i.e., easily applicable by a court. As I detail below 
(see section 7), the latter goal constitutes the trademark of the Har-
vard approach to antitrust. As Justice Breyer put it in his tribute to 
Donald Turner, Turner’s “basic point of view” was that “[a]ntitrust 
policy cannot rest upon a laundry list of fifty or a hundred different 
factors.”29 In order to achieve its main goal, namely, the protection 
of the competitive process, law enforcement had rather to be based 
on “soundly based rules using a few key factors that bench and bar 
can understand and that courts and agencies can administer.” 30
But which of the various notions of cost should become the 
threshold for the new rule? In Areeda and Turner’s short run static 
27 At the time Donald Turner was still the leading figure of the duo: a Harvard PhD 
in economics (in 1947) and law professor from 1954 to 1979, he authored with Carl 
Kaysen an influential text on antitrust law and economics and headed the Antitrust 
Division in the US Department of Justice from 1965 to 1969, where he created the 
position of Special Economic Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, the top job 
in US federal administration for an antitrust economist. With Phillip Areeda (another 
Harvard law professor and outstanding antitrust scholar), he also authored the monu-
mental. P Areeda and D F Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles 
and their Application, (7 vols Little, Brown & C, Boston 1978).  Details on Areeda 
and Turner’s lives and contributions can be found in the Winter 1996 memorial issue 
of the Antitrust Bulletin.
28 Areeda and Turner, 88(4) Harv L Rev 697–733 at 699–700 (1975 article) (cited 
in note 1).
29 S G Breyer, Donald F Turner, 41 Antitrust Bulletin 725–727 at 726 (1996).
30 Id at 726.  
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model with linear costs, the answer came directly from price theory: 
the relevant notion had to be marginal cost. Hence, no price equal or 
greater than short run marginal cost could ever be considered preda-
tory, while any price below that level should be presumed so.31 Yet, 
this version of the rule clashed with the authors’ operational pur-
pose. Actual courts would in fact find themselves in trouble if called 
to estimate a firm’s marginal cost. Keeping in mind their goal of 
being “meaningful and workable”, Areeda and Turner offered, as a 
solution; to replace in actual litigations marginal cost with a proxy, 
average variable cost (AVC hereafter). Hence, the final version of 
Areeda and Turner rule (ATR henceforth): 
“we conclude that: (a) A price at or above reasonably antici-
pated average variable cost should be conclusively presumed 
lawful. (b) A price below reasonably anticipated average vari-
able cost should be conclusively presumed unlawful.”32 
It was in this version that, to paraphrase Keynes’s famous dictum, 
the ATR “conquered [US courts] as completely as the Holy Inquisi-
tion conquered Spain”33 And it is from this conquest that our narra-
tive proceeds. 
I I I .  P l a y I n G  b y  t h e  r U l e
It is hard to say whether the ATR had the largest effect on US anti-
trust courts or on antitrust literature, as it was huge for both. As far 
as courts are concerned, the ATR is a rare instance of an economic 
idea that immediately and significantly affected law enforcement. 
The rule radically changed the courts’ attitude towards PP: from a 
percentage of victories in PP litigations of over 75% (as calculated 
by Koller),34 plaintiffs’ success rate fell to less than 20% between 
1975–1993, and in particular to 0% in the five years immediately fol-
lowing the publication of Areeda and Turner’s paper—that is to say, 
31 Areeda and Turner, 88(4) Harv L Rev 697–733 (1975 article) (cited in note 1). 
Note that the rule directly aimed at distinguishing pro-efficiency from anti-efficiency 
price cuts (every price below marginal cost being necessarily welfare-reducing), but 
neglected the issues of whether predation was profitable and whether it was a real 
world phenomenon (our second and third questions in the Introduction). In other 
words, Areeda and Turner took for granted that the court had an adequate reason to 
undertake the inquiry and apply the rule. Easterbrook, 48 (2) Univ of Chicago L Rev 
276 (cited in note 12).
32 Areeda and Turner, 88(4) Harv L Rev at 733 (cited in note 1).
33 Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money at 32 (Mac-
Millan, London 1973 [1936]),
34 Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing 45 (cited in note 5).
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no plaintiff’s victory in PP cases went on record from 1975 to 1980.35 
The paper has been quoted by more than 100 antitrust courts from 
1975 to 2000,36 and six of these courts did not even let the Harvard 
Law Review ’s ink dry before applying of this new rule, as they did 
so between early 1975 and mid-1977.37 Thus, it is an euphemism to 
say that ATR was swiftly embraced by US courts and it is hardly an 
exaggeration to claim that the rule created a situation of de facto 
per se lawfulness of every price cut, turning PP litigations, as a com-
mentator put it, into “a defendant’s paradise”38 
Why did US courts so eagerly endorse the ATR? A preliminary 
answer may be found in the above-mentioned dire straits of PP 
enforcement from the late 1960s to early 1970s. Attacked on many 
fronts for the theoretical weakness—if  not outright inconsistency—
the stories underlying their analysis of in PP cases, courts seemed 
all too happy to adopt a simple, highly operational rule that exhib-
ited the prestigious label of price theory, itself a warranty that, apart 
from material mistakes in calculating prices and costs, no decision 
based on it could ever be accused of being devoid of solid theoretical 
foundations. Hence, the immediate success of ATR revealed a clear 
preference by antitrust courts for rule-based decisions over story-
based ones.39
3.1 The ATR impact on the literature was, if possible, stronger and 
faster than the courts. A fierce debate began with big names in-
volved, such as Mike Scherer, Richard Posner, Oliver Williamson, 
Robert Bork, Dick Schmalensee, Alvin Klevorick and William Bau-
mol, all of whom published relevant contributions between 1976 
and 1979.40 These were followed in the next couple of years by survey 
35 See Bolton et al, 88 Georgetown L J 2253–54 (cited in note 23).
36 Actually, 109 times out of the 448 significant PP cases in the same period (the 
term “significant” meaning those cases where predation is referred to in either the 
case overview or the core terms). The pct. of hits is a stunning 24%. Source: Lexis.
37 The rule immediately affected the DOJ as well. Already in 1976 the Department 
dismissed a big antitrust case precisely because it fell short of satisfying the marginal/ 
average variable cost test. O E Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Wel-
fare Analysis, 87(2) Yale L J 284–340, 285 fn 5 (1977).
38 Williamson, 87(2) Yale L J at 305 (cited in note 37).
39 We will return to this issue below, Section 8.1.
40 F M Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment 89(5) Har-
vard L Rev 869–890 (1976); R A Posner, Antitrust Law Ch 7 (Chicago 1976); R A 
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis 127 U Pa L Rev 925–948 (1979); 
Williamson, Yale L J at 284–340 (cited in note 37); Bork, The Antitrust Paradox at ch 
7 (cited at note 11); R Schmalensee, On the use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The 
ReaLemon Case 127(4) U Pa L Rev 994–1050 (1979); P L Joskow and A K Klevorick, 
A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89(2) Yale L J 213–270 (1979); 
articles on PP theory and policy, such as those authored by McGee, 
Brodley and Hay and Easterbrook.41 It goes beyond the limits of the 
present paper to analyze this post-ATR literature in detail. The rest 
of this section will summarize its main threads and outcomes.
As far as the former are concerned, two major issues were tackled. 
First of all, the rule vs. story dichotomy of the contributors, though 
critic of Areeda and Turner’s specific solution, embraced their over-
all goal of achieving a “meaningful and workable” rule, capable of 
replacing all the dubious predatory stories told by pre-1975 courts. 
On the contrary, other participants in the debate were against what 
they considered a gross simplification of a tricky issue, and pressed 
hard for a return to a story-based approach, i.e., in antitrust jargon, 
for making recourse to a full rule of reason inquiry. A third posi-
tion was held by those scholars who argued that PP was hardly an 
issue at all and thus were in a sense neutral with respect to the rules 
vs. stories debate they believed that every rule or story, if rigorous 
enough, would inevitably reveal that predation could never be ratio-
nal business behavior. 
The champion of the rule of reason approach was Mike Scherer, 
who was actually the first to react against Areeda and Turner’s pa-
per.42 This is remarkable because Scherer also came from Harvard 
University—that is to say, authored by a Harvard antitrust econo-
mist dismissing an argument by two prominent Harvard antitrust 
lawyers. Maybe the infeud had to do partly with the defense of the 
economists’ own territory,43 but the main reason behind it was 
Scherer’s prescience of the inevitable outcome of ATR in the courts, 
namely, the de facto legalization of every price cut by market lead-
ers—something no supporter of Harvard’s structure-conduct per-
formance mantra could digest. Hence, he argued that it was both 
unrealistic and analytically incorrect to apply a simple short-run 
price-cost rule for assessing whether a price be predatory. Only a 
complete examination of facts, intent and market structure44—i.e. 
W J Baumol, Quasi-permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of 
Predatory Pricing, 89(1) Yale L J 1–26 (1979). Remarkably, most of this literature ap-
peared in law, not economics, journals.
41 JS McGee, Predatory Price Revisited, 23(2) J Law & Econ 289–330 (1980); Brod-
ley and Hay, 66 Cornell L Rev 738–803 (cited in note 8); Easterbrook, 48 (2) Univ of 
Chicago L Rev (cited in note 12).
42 Scherer, Harvard L Rev 869–890 (cited in note 40).
43 Indeed Scherer began his attack by complaining that Areeda and Turner simply 
did not know price theory enough to offer a rigorous argument. Scherer, Harvard L 
Rev 869 (cited in note 40).
44 “[A] thorough examination of the factual circumstances accompanying the mo-
nopolist’s alleged predatory behavior, how the monopolist’s officials perceived the 
probable effects of its behavior (i.e., intent), and the structural consequences actually 
flowing from the behavior” Id at 890.
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a full-blown rule of reason methodology—could save courts from 
making the wrong decision.
In their reply, Areeda and Turner pointed out that long run wel-
fare effects—of the kind that had to be evaluated for applying the 
rule of reason—are intrinsically speculative and indeterminate, so 
much so that no suitable administrable rule could be formulated 
to give them recognition. Scherer’s checklist of relevant features to 
be assessed in order to validate a price cut could not be realistically 
used, either ex ante by a monopolist wishing to determine the legal 
floor for its pricing policy, or ex post by a court. Hence, in the very 
spirit of their 1975 paper, they concluded that “Scherer’s constructs 
for determining what price will maximize long-run welfare have no 
operational utility for antitrust law purposes. [. . .] We adhere to our 
position that a test which is reasonably determinable and which 
plainly maximizes short-run welfare is the most sensible solution.”45 
Scherer had failed to understand that Areeda and Turner never 
intended to deny that, say, even an above-cost price set by a domi-
nant firm might well be harmful for competition and welfare. Their 
whole point was that, given the institutional limitations of courts 
and agencies, there was no reliable way to condemn such behav-
iour without chilling pro-competitive conduct. Indeed, calling into 
play as an essential ingredient of law enforcement elements like the 
defendant’s intent “was precisely the evil that Areeda and Turner 
were seeking to avoid, and the evil committed by earlier deci-
sions.”46 
Yet Scherer’s suggestion found more favorable reception in 
authors such as Dick Schmalensee or Alvin Klevorick.47 The for-
mer argued that, absent any simple predation model with a clear 
45 Areeda and D F Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89(5) Harv L Rev 
891–900, at 897 (1976). Curiously, these critiques were echoed by Chicago cham-
pion Robert Bork, who deemed Scherer’s proposal simply unworkable. In reference to 
Scherer’s list of features on which courts were called to inquiry, Bork claimed that: 
“There could hardly be drawn a list of criteria less fit for judicial employment. Those 
items on the list that would not be altered by the monopolist’s knowledge of the 
rules are unknowable by either courts or economists. It is a mistake to suppose that 
all of the questions posed by in abstract geometric representation of demand and cost 
phenomena can usefully be addressed in a court proceeding.” Bork, The Antitrust 
Paradox at 155 (cited in note 11).  In his rejoinder to Areeda and Turner, Scherer ac-
knowledged that speculative elements were inescapable in his suggested procedure, 
but also remarked that speculation was not new to antitrust adjudication, nor were 
the information requirements as big as implied by Areeda and Turner’s reply. F M 
Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing 89(5) Harv L Rev 901–903 (1976).
46 H Hovenkamp, The Areeda-Turner Treatise in Antitrust Analysis, 41 Antitrust 
Bulletin 815–842, 835 (1996).                                     
47 Schmalensee, 127(4) U Pa L Rev 994–1050 (cited in note 40); A K Klevorick, The 
Current State of the Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, 83(2) Am Econ Rev, 
Papers and Proceedings 162–197 (1993). 
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test, the only two robust approaches to PP were either the “hands 
off”, Chicago-style approach—i.e., to drop the conduct from the list 
of proscribed practices—or Scherer’s rule of reason, this being “the 
only one economically defensible general policy choice.48 The lat-
ter, in an influential paper with Paul Joskow, suggested a two-tier 
rule of reason approach, premised on the circumstance that no 
straightforward rule based only on behavioral considerations (such 
as the ATR, but also the rules by Williamson or Baumol, on which 
see below) could provide a proper means for distinguishing amongst 
different market situations, and thus minimizing judicial errors. 
Only their two-tier rule of reason—which required a Harvard-style 
structural analysis in the first stage and a behavioral inquiry in the 
second stage, but only for those cases where structural analysis 
yielded a reasonable expectation that the predator might have actu-
ally exploited its monopoly power—could combine sufficient flex-
ibility in response to market specificities with the minimization of 
implementation costs.49 
 Another authoritative endorsement of Scherer’s view came in the 
conclusions of Joseph Brodley and George Hay’s 1981 survey.50 They 
acknowledged that “[p]rior to 1975, predatory pricing was a loosely 
structured, somewhat opaque area of law in which the generality of 
the legal standard left room for the exercise of judicial discretion.”51 
Still, a few years’ experience with ATR had convinced Brodley and 
Hay that, due to “[t]he adoption of a marginal cost pricing rule by 
several courts [. . .] the range of judicial discretion was seriously 
confined.,”52, so much so that “consistent litigation losses by plain-
tiffs demonstrated that for all practical purposes a predatory pricing 
plaintiff could not meet the standard imposed by the marginal cost 
rule.”53 As a consequence, the ATR “. . . holds dominant firm pric-
ing per se legal.” This was unacceptable because “[m]ore recent eco-
nomic literature [. . .] fails to demonstrate a consensus justifying the 
dismissal of predatory pricing as irrational behavior”54 and because 
“the courts did not purport to adopt the marginal cost pricing rule 
as a device for eliminating the predatory pricing offense and estab-
48 Schmalensee, 127(4) U Pa L Rev at 1027 (cited in note 40).
49 Joskow and Klevorick, 89(2) Yale L J at 213–270 at 243 (cited in note 45).
50 Brodley and Hay, 66 Cornell L Rev 738–803 (cited in note 8). Hay was chief 
economist at the US Department of Justice from 1973 to 1980. He is credited with 
having played a major role in convincing the DOJ to hire “real” (i.e., PhD) economists 
in order to apply “real” economic theory to antitrust issues (R.T. Masson, personal 
communication, April 21, 2009). 
51 Brodley and Hay, 66 Cornell L Rev 738–803 at 792 (cited in note 8).




lishing the per legality of dominant firm pricing.”55 The authors 
endorsed a rule of reason solution and provocatively asked: “do not 
all of the preceding considerations suggest a renewed emphasis on 
the values and insights inlaid in long-standing judicial experience, 
built upon case-by-case adjudication, and on the advantage of incre-
mental policy change, achieved gradually and with opportunity for 
self-correction?”56 
The reason I have given so much room to Scherer’s position in the 
debate is that his views anticipated one of the main outcomes of the 
subsequent game-theoretic literature on predation, namely, the im- 
possibility of identifying a so-called “bright line standard”, i.e., a 
simple rule capable of discerning with high reliability when a given 
price/quantity pair set by a firm could be deemed predatory. As I 
explain below, applying strategic reasoning to PP forces plaintiffs to 
devise a plausible story explaining why the available facts consti-
tute evidence of predatory behavior. Though game theory suggests 
that all plausible PP stories have to fall within one or the other of 
a few general categories, a court will always have to examine the 
soundness of the specific story offered by the plaintiff, i.e., to under-
take a rule-of-reason scrutiny. In short, Scherer’s rule of reason and 
game-theoretic reasoning share a hostility towards the application 
of simple, mechanical rules and a clear inclination for careful, case-
by-case analysis. 
3.2 Even the opposite side in the post-ATR debate is more interest-
ing for its background and general implications than for its specific 
suggestions. There we find those who remained faithful to Areeda 
and Turner’s message, yet argued for a different and better rule. The 
list of alternatives is quite long, the main ones being the rules sug-
gested by the likes of Richard Posner, who argued that, since PP 
only caused trouble when a less efficient predator killed a more effi-
cient rival, a price should be automatically considered exclusionary 
if and only if it had been set to exclude from the market an equally 
or more efficient competitor;57 Oliver Williamson, who focused 
on entry deterrence and claimed that an output, rule made more 
economic sense than a price one, in particular a rule forbidding a 
market leader to expand its short run output following a rival’s en-
try, regardless of the price being above AVC;58 and William Baumol, 
whose quasi-permanent price cut rule left the market leader free to 
55 Id.
56 Id at 794.
57 Posner, Antitrust Law at 188 (cited in note 40); Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 
939–944 (cited in note 40).
58 Williamson, Yale L J at 334 (cited in note 37).
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cut prices following entry, but forbade him to re-raise the price in 
case the entrant left the market.59 What is really remarkable in these 
rules is not their specific content, but the kind of analysis, that sup-
ported them. Everyone recognized that the major fault in Areeda 
and Turner’s analysis was their neglect of the strategic and inter-
temporal character of predatory behavior—a critique also shared by 
Scherer and the other supporters of the rule of reason approach, but 
more biting when made by scholars endorsing Areeda and Turner’s 
operational urge. 
The author who most emphasized this oversight in Areeda and 
Turner’s 1975 article was Oliver Williamson. His 1977 contribution 
to the debate may be taken as the clearest exposition of the stra-
tegic and intertemporal aspects of PP before the advent of formal 
game theory.60 His model explicitly acknowledged: i) that predation 
could be used for entry deterrence as much as for the elimination 
of existing rivals;61 ii) that the standard notion of “sacrifice prof-
its now for higher profits tomorrow” necessarily entailed a kind of 
strategic reasoning and had to be explicitly modeled in an inter-
temporal setup;62 iii) that PP could be used strategically as a signal 
to deter future entry; iv) that, crucially, the market leader might 
strategically perform some pre-entry actions, like building an excess 
capacity, which aimed at preempt entry itself (a point for which 
Williamson recognized his debt to Michael Spence’s formal model 
of pre-entry strategic choices)63; and v) that the leader’s strategic 
adaptation to the law had also to be considered when devising a rule 
aimed at addressing predatory behavior. Nonetheless, Williamson 
still endorsed Areeda and Turner’s operational goal, while rejecting 
Scherer’s proposal.64
59 Baumol, 89(1) Yale L J at 1–26 (cited in note 40). We may add the second stage 
of Joskow and Klevorick’s two-tier approach. The authors suggested that courts adopt 
for that stage both the basic AVC version of the ATR, as a quick check of predation, 
and a total cost standard, whereby a price should be deemed predatory if less than 
average total cost (ATC hereafter) or, in case of multi-product firms, average incre-
mental cost (AIC hereafter). Joskow and Klevorick, 89(2) Yale L J at 245 and fns (cited 
in note 40). AIC it had been first proposed in Baumol, 89(1) Yale L J at 9 fn 26 (cited 
in note 40).
60 Williamson, Yale L J at 284–287(cited in note 40).
61 More than that: according to Williamson, specific examples could be built 
where PP was seemingly unprofitable with respect to the exclusionary goal and yet 
fully rational in view of the entry deterrence purpose.  
62 This was also the spirit of Baumol’s pricing rule, which was explicitly addressed 
at destroying the “low profits now, higher profits tomorrow” rationale of PP. Baumol, 
89(1) Yale L J at 5 (cite in note 40).
63 A M Spence, Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 Bell J 
Econ 534–544 (1977).
64 This in a long footnote where he argued that following Scherer would entail re-
placing antitrust enforcement with a sort of market regulation by a price commission: 
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As previously noted, Williamson rule looked at the leader’s out-
put and imposed that he abstains from increasing his quantity fol-
lowing a rival’s entry. The rule clearly aimed at neutralizing the 
leader’s threat to make recourse to his pre-entry-built excess capac-
ity in order to flood the market and thus push the price below the 
level any entrant would find sustainable. This would make the lead-
er’s (socially inefficient, but privately long run profitable) choice of 
building an excess capacity irrational in the first place. Williamson 
also noted that ATR could not prevent, or prohibit, this kind of pre-
 entry behavior, as long as the price following post-entry output 
expansion was still above the leader’s marginal or average variable 
costs. It followed that, despite Areeda and Turner’s claims, the 
ATR was unable to warrant social efficiency both before and after 
entry.65 
In view of the later history of PP law and economics, the most 
remarkable outcome of the intense debate following Areeda and 
Turner 1975 was precisely the emphasis on the strategic and inter-
temporal features of PP. This was not entirely novel, because sim-
ilar considerations had also been raised during the 1960s and the 
early 1970s debate stemming from McGee’s work.66 But never before 
had the strategic and intertemporal character of predatory behavior 
been more clearly revealed than in Williamson’s paper. Moreover, 
this literature explicitly made the point that only by focusing on 
these features could the rationality of PP be demonstrated. In other 
words, giving full weight to strategic and intertemporal aspects was 
the necessary, and often also sufficient, condition to prove that PP 
might well be a profitable business strategy and so could really hap-
pen in the real world, especially if left unchallenged by antitrust 
law. Given that ATR could not handle the strategic and intertem-
poral features of PP, some of the authors in the post-ATR debate 
aimed at devising new and better rules to fill in the gap, while oth-
ers denied that any simple rule could ever work. In short, at the end 
of the 1970s everyone involved in the theoretical debate shared the 
notion that only a properly constructed story, with explicit room for 
strategic and intertemporal elements, might justify the existence of 
PP as an antitrust violation. 
“Rather than slip inadvertently into a regulatory posture—which, experience discloses, 
is typically hostile toward competition—antitrust is better advised to seek simple rules 
enforceable in court.”  Williamson, Yale L J at 288, fn 16 (cited in note 40).
65 Id at 335.
66 The most “strategically oriented” paper had been Yamey’s 1972 article. B S 
Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15(1) J L Econ 129–142 (1972). 
See Giocoli, 18(5) Eur J Hist of Econ Thought at 77–806 (cited in note 2) for more 
details. 
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3.4 Even the authors in the Chicago tradition could not avoid deal-
ing with the strategic and intertemporal features of PP. For example, 
having recognized that McGee himself had neglected the strategic 
considerations, Richard Posner concluded that because of this omis-
sion, “it is not surprising that the Chicago school should not have 
been particularly concerned with predatory pricing. Eliminate stra-
tegic considerations, and it becomes impossible to construct a ratio-
nal motivation for predatory pricing without assuming (very uncon-
genially to a Chicagoan) asymmetric access to the capital markets 
for financing a period of below-cost selling. But to ignore strategic 
considerations is not satisfactory.”67 Thus, all Chicagoans contrib-
uting to the post-ATR debate had at least to take position with re-
spect to the role played by strategic and intertemporal elements, if 
only to dismiss their relevance. 
Think of Bork’s 1978 critiques against Scherer’s proposal.68 In 
these words one may read a leitmotif of the Chicago approach, not 
only to PP, but to antitrust enforcement in general, namely, the idea 
that courts will never have the amount of information required to 
properly perform a rule of reason analysis without risking to com-
mit serious mistakes. This critique applies to the rule of reason, 
but also—indeed, more forcefully—to the kind of stories proposed 
in the post-ATR debate, as even those stories may well be consid-
ered a manifestation of the “abstract geometric representation of 
demand and cost phenomena.”69 Or think of McGee’s reassessment 
of predatory pricing where, while defending what he himself called 
the “diehard Chicagoan position” according to which attempts at 
predation “have been rare, and [. . .] successful attempts will be 
found to be still rarer.”,70 he claimed that if a workable rule was 
ever to be called forth, it had to be a cost-based rule. Among the rea-
sons for this thesis, McGee gave the difficult assessment and actual 
irrelevance of the price cutter’s intent and the rivals’ mental states, 
on the one side, and the empirical impossibility to distinguish be-
tween short- and long-run profit maximization, on the other.71 Two 
reasons that clearly addressed, and countered, the building blocks 
67  Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 939 (cited in note 40).
68 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (cited at note 11). For Scherer’s proposal, see above, 
Section 3.1.
69 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox at 155 (cited at note 11).
70 McGee, 23 (2) J L & Econ, 292 (cited in note 41). McGee’s words will be re-
produced almost verbatim in 1986 by the Supreme Court in its famous Matsushita 
dictum “. . . predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely suc-
cessful.” See below, Section 7.
71 Id at 292.
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of those “increasingly complex and speculative models” of preda-
tion endowed with strategic and intertemporal features.72
Bork’s critiques were echoed by Easterbrook.73 In one of the ear-
liest papers in the Chicago tradition to acknowledge the pending 
game-theoretic revolution in IO, Easterbrook devoted two long sec-
tions to “Signaling from one market to another” and “Strategic 
commitments.”74 In the former he dealt with the argument that a 
firm may aim at building a reputation of ruthless predator in order 
to persuade rivals to stay out of, or abandon, its markets. The analy-
sis was not explicitly game-theoretic, but a few hints illuminated 
the reader about what would soon come about in IO. For exam-
ple, Easterbrook offered the gist of Reinherdt Selten’s chain store 
paradox, namely, that under perfect information no predation will 
ever occur (see next Section), yet without quoting Selten’s semi-
nal paper.75 In any case, his conclusion about signaling and repu-
tation models (see again next Section) was trenchant: “it has not 
been proved that predatory signaling is a profitable strategy. [. . .] 
the inconclusive arguments about signaling are inadequate to jus-
tify legal intervention.”76 A similar skepticism pervaded the fol-
lowing section of Easterbrook’s survey, dedicated to “Strategic com-
mitments”, in particular Michael Spence’s model of entry-deterring 
investment77 and Williamson’s output rule. According to Easter-
brook, entry deterrence theories of PP were basically flawed, so 
much so that “[a]ny attempt to condemn capacity selection de-
cisions as predatory carries with it an unavoidable risk of deter-
ring firms from selecting the most desirable response to change.”78 
Among the papers he quoted featured one by P. Milgrim (sic!) and 
72 A more explicit critique against the entry deterrence view of PP is at pp. 298–300 
of McGee’s 1980 article. McGee, 23(2) J Law & Econ at 298–300 (cited in note 41).
73 Easterbrook, 48 (2) Univ of Chicago L Rev at 263–337 (cited in note 12).
74 Id at 282 & accompanying fns.
75 Id at 285–286. What Easterbrook did refer to was a 1980 NBER paper by 
R. Masson and R. Roberts (sic! The real co-author was Robert Reynolds) which how-
ever was never published, following rejection from the Rand Journal of Economics 
(Robert Masson, personal communication, April 21, 2009). As a testimony to the new 
game-theoretic fashion in 1980s IO, that very work eventually led to a publication in 
the 1985 Journal of Industrial Economics, but only after the addition of a third co- 
author (David Easley) and the injection of a new formal argument based on Harsanyi’s 
games of incomplete information (instead of the rational expectations approach used 
in 1980). The published paper is D Easley, R T Masson and R J Reynolds, Preying for 
Time, 33 J Industrial Econ 445–460, (1985), one of the most quoted contributions to 
the game-theoretic literature on PP.   
76 Easterbrook, 48 (2) Univ of Chicago L Rev at 288 (cited in note 12). 
77 A M Spence, 8 Bell J Econ (cited in note 63).
78 Easterbrook, 48 (2) Univ of Chicago L Rev at 290 (cited in note 12).
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J. Roberts, titled “Equilibrium limit pricing doesn’t limit entry,” 
that is to say, the early version of the enormously influential 1982 
article by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts that, as I argue below, offi-
cially launched the modern game-theoretic approach to PP.79 Clearly 
un-persuaded by the alleged theoretical progress brought by strate-
gic analysis, Easterbrook found no reason to renege on his ironic 
statement that predation theories were so variegated “for the same 
reason that 600 years ago there were a thousand positions on what 
dragons looked like.”80 
In conclusion, the main element of novelty emerging from the 
heated post-ATR debate was brought by neither the plea for a come-
back to fully-fledged rule of reason scrutiny, nor the search for more 
refined cost-based or quantity-based rules. Regardless of their beliefs 
in the frequency and seriousness of PP as an antitrust offense, all 
of the authors either built, or at least made use of, predation sto-
ries that contained explicit intertemporal and strategic features. 
Static, non-strategic analysis—of  the kind underlying the old legal 
approach to PP cases or Areeda and Turner’s paper—seemed com-
pletely inadequate in dealing with predation. At the same time, 
these stories showed that the Chicago mantra of PP as “rarely tried 
and even more rarely successful” had to be qualified, if not wholly 
discarded, in view of plausible narratives showing that predation 
could actually be rational business behavior. Even those authors 
who abided by Areeda and Turner’s operational imperative and who 
synthesized their contribution in terms of a court-friendly rule had 
to recognize that the call for new rules stemmed from the inade-
quacy of the ATR to discriminate among price cuts in a strategic and 
intertemporal environment. And even those others who stuck to the 
Chicago mantra could not avoid dealing with the new and richer sto-
ries of PP if they wished to uphold their derogatory thesis. 
3.5 What was the outcome of the post-ATR debate in US antitrust 
courts? As with the original Areeda and Turner’s article, the im-
pact was quick and relevant. Out of 249 significant81 PP cases in 
the period between 1975 and 1992, at least 18 quoted Scherer 1976 
(the first in 1977), 18 referred to Williamson 1977 (first hit in 1978), 
6 to Baumol 1979, and 10 to Joskow and Klevorick 1979 (Source: 
Lexis). In terms of actual law enforcement, absent a new Supreme 
Court pronouncement on the issue, most courts endorsed a kind of 
79 P Milgrom and J Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Informa-
tion: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50 Econometrica 443– 459 (1982).
80 Easterbrook, 48 (2) Univ of Chicago L Rev at 264 (cited in note 12).
81 On the meaning of “significant” in this context see note 36.
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“augmented ATR”,82 which amounted to considering surely lawful 
a price above average total cost and surely unlawful a price below 
average variable cost, while considering presumably lawful—a pre-
sumption rebuttable by evidence of intent and market structure—a 
price between AVC and ATC. 
The “augmented ATR”, which recalled the solution suggested 
by Joskow and Klevorick83 and Brodley and Hay,84 brought to an 
“enforcement equilibrium” in that, far from the populist excesses of 
the pre-ATR era, plaintiffs enjoyed for a decade or so a low but non-
negligible success rate in PP cases: about 17% between 1982 and 
1993, up from almost nil in the years immediately after the ATR.85 
Adding the out-of-trial settlements, this is a number that might 
well represent a balanced approach to the violation. The equilibrium 
was broken only in 1993, with the Supreme Court’s Brooke decision 
that caused the success rate in PP litigations to drop once more to 
0%, leading to a new era of de facto legalization of any price cut by 
a dominant firm—an era that continues to the present.86 
Leaving to Sections 6–7 my assessment of Brooke, two remarks 
may be appropriate here. First, US antitrust courts seemed to be re-
ceptive to the kind of PP stories told in the post-ATR literature, 
but only as long as these stories were translated into an operational 
cost-based rule like the “augmented-ATR”. In other words, rather 
than being persuaded by the intertemporal and strategic arguments 
underlying the new stories, courts were attracted by the higher flex-
ibility of the new rules with respect to the strict yes-or-no character 
of the original ATR. This confirms that at least some of the econ-
omists involved in the debate had apparently learned Areeda and 
Turner’s lesson on how to have an impact on the courts—i.e., by 
offering simple and highly operational rules.
The second remark is that, theoretically speaking, the “enforce-
ment equilibrium” should have shifted in the opposite direction. 
As I stated previously, the year 1982 marked the official beginning 
of the new game-theoretic approach to PP. In the following decades 
that approach has produced several rigorous demonstrations that, 
far from being irrational, predatory behavior may well be the most 
profitable choice for a dominant firm in a variety of plausible set-
tings—in other words, that many convincing stories may be told 
in the courts to demonstrate that PP is an actual possibility. More-
82 Bolton et al, 88 Georgetown L J 2253 (cited in note 23) (this article named it).
83 Joskow and Klevorick, 89(2) Yale L J at 245 and fns (cited in note 40).
84 Brodley and Hay, 66 Cornell L Rev at 738–803 (cited in note 8).
85 Bolton et al, 88 Georgetown L J 2254 (cited in note 23).
86 Brooke Group Ltd. v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209 (1993).
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over, one of the key findings has been the irrelevance of relation-
ship between the alleged predatory price and the leader’s production 
costs; this entails that the boundaries of the “augmented ATR” may 
well be trespassed, as even a price above ATC may still be predatory 
if properly interpreted in terms of a rigorous strategic story. Thus, 
one should expect that, as it had happened in 1975, antitrust courts 
would swiftly embrace the new theories, and accordingly revise their 
pro-plaintiff record. Yet, the opposite actually happened: Brooke shifted 
the enforcement equilibrium further from where adherence to the 
new strategic theories should have led it. At the same time, the game-
theoretic approach to predation has been almost totally neglected by 
US courts
I V .  I t ’ S  a  b r a n d  n e w  G a m e :  t h e  
m e t h o d o l o G y  o F  S t r a t e G I c  P r e d a t I o n
The development of rigorous strategic models for PP in the early 
1980s is a landmark in the history of modern game theory. These 
were among the earliest models where new techniques and solution 
concepts were applied to analyze the so-called asymmetric informa-
tion games (AIG henceforth), i.e., games devoid of the traditional 
assumption of perfect information. It goes well beyond the bound-
aries of this paper to investigate how and why AIG were developed, 
as well as their influence on the rise of modern information econom-
ics (including mechanism design theory), and on the establishment 
of game theory as the hard core of neoclassical economics (a result 
the first generation of game theorists had largely missed).87 Suffice 
it here to say that, thanks to the contributions of Reinherd Selten 
and John Harsanyi, and the related extension of strategic analysis 
to games with imperfect or incomplete information, it is hardly an 
exaggeration to speak of a late 1970s–early 1980s “resurrection” of 
game theory—a fresh start whose eventual consequences may be best 
appreciated by comparing the discipline’s relevance within econom-
ics before and after those crucial years. Indeed, the circumstance 
that some of the foundational papers of the AIG literature were also 
the milestone for the strategic approach to PP may somehow make 
up for a more thorough reconstruction. The gist of the argument 
supporting the strategic analysis of predation may in fact partly 
capture the actual motivation behind the overall “resurrection” of 
game theory. 
87 It is a story still awaiting to be fully told, but see N Giocoli, Three Alternative 
(?) Stories on the Late 20th-Century Rise of Game Theory,14 (2)  Studi e Note di 
Economia, 187–210 (2009).
nicola Giocoli 293
The crucial role played by Selten in this story makes it hardly sur-
prising that one of those key papers was his classic 1978 contribu-
tion, with the celebrated chain store paradox.88 In that paper Selten 
proved that no predation existed in the game equilibrium under per-
fect information. Yet, from the viewpoint of antitrust law and eco-
nomics, the real message of Selten’s result—and the correct way to 
interpret it—was the opposite. PP could not be a problem only under 
the heroic assumption of perfect information, because the assump-
tion was crucial for the logic of backward induction to generate the 
paradoxical outcome. Thus, the result looked like an invitation to 
game theorists to investigate what the game equilibrium would be 
with the addition of a bit of imperfect or incomplete information. 
And given that PP was the specific instance of economic behavior 
that Selten had chosen in order to exemplify his analytical result, 
it was natural for those accepting Selten’s invitation to build their 
new games around predation stories.
Why did Selten choose PP as the theme for his seminal paper? 
More importantly,89 why did predation provide such a fertile ground 
for the new game-theoretic literature? Part of the answer is that, 
since the postwar years, IO problems in less-than-perfectly competi-
tive markets have always constituted the most natural setting for 
game theory. But why PP in particular (i.e., a problem of dominant 
firm behavior) instead of a more obvious pick, like, say, oligopoly or 
collusion? The answer lies in what economists had already noticed 
as the necessary intertemporal and strategic characteristics of pre-
dation. The simple notion of “cut price now to earn more profits 
tomorrow” creates a very friendly environment for AIG modeling 
because it is a notion which—generally speaking—calls for the for-
mulation of sequential strategies by both the predator and the pos-
sible prey, with each of these strategies entailing an account of a 
firm’s knowledge and expectations about the rival’s characteristics 
and behavior. Moreover, several stories already existed to render in 
plain language the conjectural and behavioral sequences underlying 
a predation episode. As we know from the previous sections, these 
were all features of PP that economists had well understood by the 
late 1970s. What game theorists were required to do was simply to 
formalize them by either transforming existing PP stories into for-
mal sequences of actions and beliefs or inventing brand new ones. 
Furthermore, PP offered highbrow game theorists the ideal environ-
ment to give actual import to what would otherwise look like purely 
abstract arguments (think of the new solution concepts for Bayesian 
88 R. Selten, The Chain-Store Paradox, 9 Theory & Decision, 127–59 (1978).
89 Especially in view of Selten’s own answer to the previous question: see id at 
158, fn.1.
games), totally detached from real world problems. In other words, 
assuming you were a game theorist, still striving in the early 1980s 
to persuade the wider audience of economics practitioners of the 
practical relevance of your analytical tools, the problem of predation 
offered an excellent opportunity to score a few easy points. Indeed, 
by focusing on the more reasonable case of imperfect or incomplete 
information, AIG also scored a point in terms of superior realism, if 
compared with the (often implicit) assumption of perfect informa-
tion for standard price-theoretic models.90
The events following Selten’s 1978 result are fairly well known by 
anybody acquainted with modern IO. In 1982, two pairs of authors, 
John Milgrom and Paul Roberts, and David Kreps and David Wilson, 
published a set of papers91 that, by applying AIG to the twin prob-
lems of limit and predatory pricing, marked the official beginning of 
the modern game-theoretic approach to antitrust economics—where 
the italicized word “modern” should be read as synonymous to “à la 
Harsanyi-Selten”, i.e., of games with less than perfect information. 
After this first inflow, a flood of strategic literature followed. At 
the end of the 1980s, the entire field of IO had been re-designed in 
terms of game-theoretic tools, methods and ways of reasoning. One 
of clearest signs of the success of game theory in conquering IO—
thereby fulfilling 45 years later the prediction first formulated at 
the time of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior 92—was the publication in 1989 of the Hand-
book of Industrial Organization, a magnus opus and fundamental 
reference where game-theoretic modeling was simply ubiquitous. 93 
90 I just mention here another possible explanation for the game theorists’ choice, 
namely, an “ideological” willingness to apply the new tools of AIG in order to coun-
ter the success (especially in courtrooms) of the Chicago approach to antitrust, of 
which the new legal attitude towards PP was one of the clearest manifestation. This 
is for example what may be drawn from Robert Wilson’s brief explanation of the 
motivation behind the AIG literature.  R Wilson, Strategic Models of Entry Deter-
rence, in R Aumann and S Hart, eds, 1 The Handbook of Game Theory, 306 (North-
Holland, Amsterdam 1992).  We will examine an explicit effort in this direction be-
low, section 9.   
91 P Milgrom and J Roberts, 50 Econometrica 443–459 (cited at note 79); P Mil-
grom and J Roberts, Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence,  27 J Econ Theory 
280–312 (1982); D Kreps and R Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 
J Econ Theory 253–79 (1982).
92 “This work [i.e., AIG] holds some promise of yielding a partial and much- 
belated realization of some of the hopes that were expressed in the early years of game 
theory.” P Milgrom and J Roberts, Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior, 
and Industrial Organization, 77 (2) Am Econ Rev, Papers & Proceedings 187 (1987).
93 R Schmalensee R. and R D Willig, The Handbook of Industrial Organization 
(North-Holland, Amsterdam 1989).
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The common thread in the three foundational papers was that, in 
a realistic setup of less than perfect information, a firm endowed 
with market power may try to discourage competitors from entering, 
or remaining, in the market by manipulating their beliefs. The idea 
was introduced in Milgrom and Roberts Econometrica paper and 
applied to limit pricing, but it was soon extended by the same au-
thors, as well as by Kreps and Wilson, to PP. When a firm considers 
entering a market, it must base its decision on its expectations of 
post-entry profits. This depends on whether the incumbent responds 
aggressively and, if so, on the intensity of the aggressive response 
(say, how much will the price fall following entry?). Hence, the po-
tential entrant’s expectations are crucial in determining its own en-
try decision. But the incumbent can, through its actions, influence 
these expectations.94 
While it would be impossible to manipulate a rival’s beliefs under 
the perfect information setup in price-theoretic models, adding a lit-
tle bit of either asymmetric or incomplete information makes the 
trick. For example, by responding aggressively to entry, a predator 
may be able to convince that specific entrant, or any other future 
entrant, that entry is unprofitable. It follows that predation does not 
even have to “kill” the competitor in order to achieve its goal of 
affecting the rivals’ expectations and thus be a profitable strategy. 
In the case of a multi-market incumbent, it is not even necessary 
that the predator directly profits from its price-cutting in the con-
tested market. Moreover, contrary to McGee’s 1958 results (which 
Milgrom and Roberts wrongly took as the state-of-the-art on in PP 
literature),95 if the incumbent does succeed to drive a competitor out 
of the market, new entry will not inevitably follow as soon as the 
incumbent raises its price to reap the benefits of its success because 
it is now possible that other potential entrants—having witnessed 
the poor lot of their predecessor—will no longer expect entry to be 
profitable.
Assessing their achievement in a 1987 paper,96 Milgrom and Rob-
erts identified PP as the best example of the theoretical gains pro-
94 P Milgrom, Predatory Pricing, in: J Eatwell, M Milgate and P Newman (eds.), 
The New Palgrave. A Dictionary of Economics (MacMillan, London 1988).
95 P Milgrom and J Roberts, Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior, and 
Industrial Organization, 77 (2) Am Econ Rev, Papers and Proceedings 184–193 at 
185 (1987). This position was only partially corrected in a later paper, where they 
still failed to mention the strategic-oriented post-ATR literature. P Milgrom and J 
Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing, in G Bonanno and D Brandolini (eds.), 
Industrial Structure in the New Industrial Economics 112–137 (Oxford 1990).
96 Milgrom and Roberts, 77 (2) Am Econ Rev (cited at note 95)
vided by the AIG perspective. Totally neglecting the outcomes of the 
post-ATR debates, and in clear reference to the most extreme Chi-
cago position, they claimed that, circa 1980, the only consistent anal-
ysis of PP, based as it was on the compelling logic of standard price 
theory, indicated that predation could not be expected to succeed and 
was not a rational strategy. Notwithstanding real world instances 
of PP by dominant firms, mainstream economists were unshaken: 
“because no mere fact ever was a match in economics for a con-
sistent theory, these ideas began to represent the basis for a new con-
sensus.”97 Yet, they continued, this consensus decisively rested on 
the implicit assumption of symmetric information. It was precisely 
here that their contribution had brought a crucial improvement, first 
and foremost in terms of the realism of the model’s conclusions. AIG 
showed that predation could well be rational under more realistic 
informational settings, so much so that we should expect to see pred-
atory strategies being undertaken by real world firms, unless effec-
tively deterred by legal prohibitions. Milgrom and Roberts proudly 
concluded that in a few years the AIG methodology had allowed the 
first truly satisfactory treatment of a vexed issue like PP. This was 
a general result: the kind of business behavior emerging from AIG’s 
equilibria captured a lot more of the richness of observed reality.98
One last crucial innovation brought by AIG to PP literature is the 
dismissal of cost considerations as the essential tool for demonstrat-
ing actual predation. Game-theoretic models undermine the ATR 
and all its variants because AIG not only shows that predation can 
be profitable, but also that predatory prices “bear no necessary rela-
tion” to the incumbent’s marginal or average costs.99 This is the 
logical consequence of the fact that predation aims at affecting the 
rivals’ expectations of future profits. Why should such an effect 
depend on the incumbent’s production costs? At most, it should 
depend on the entrant’s costs—and possibly on none’s costs at all. 
As a confirmation, the PP stories emerging from the AIG literature 
hardly make any reference to production costs. It is to these stories 
that we now turn.
V .  a n d  a  n e w  P l a y b o o k  t o o !
Among the early 1980s game-theoretic models featured a rigorous 
formulation of the traditional deep-pocket version of PP, frequently 
97 Id at 185.
98 Id at 187. On superior realism, rather than higher rigor, being the true plus of AIG, 
also see L Phlips, The Economics of Imperfect Information, ch 7 (Cambridge 1988).
99 P Milgrom and J Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing at 115 (cited in 
note 95).
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referred to in the legal realm (see above, section 1). In a 1984 paper 
Jean-Pierre Benoit showed that even that story, effectively demol-
ished by McGee in 1958, could nonetheless be rescued and given a 
solid theoretical basis if some asymmetric information (e.g. about 
the depth of a firm’s pocket) was added to the model. 
Assume the entrant is financially constrained as in the classic 
legal story. If the incumbent is uncertain about the entrant’s will-
ingness to fight predation until bankruptcy, then PP episodes may 
actually happen. In other words, under less-than-perfect information 
a predatory price war—aimed at the “usual goal” of driving the en-
trant out of the market (not at deterring other potential entrants, 
like in most AIG models) and ending up with either cooperation or 
the entrant’s defeat—may obtain as an equilibrium phenomenon.100 
Thus, as long argued in legal literature, it may sometimes be ratio-
nal for a firm that is financially stronger than another to use its 
deeper pockets to set a low price and force its rival out of the mar-
ket. Note that this is the only instance of an AIG-based story where 
below-cost pricing is essential for predation, though even here price 
need not be below the predator’s marginal or average cost as in ATR. 
What is needed is that price be set so low that it generates a negative 
cash flow for the prey. Hence, it is the prey’s costs that matter, not 
the predator’s.101 
Apart from Benoit’s model, the new AIG playbook of PP only con-
tained stories where predation was used to manipulate the other 
firms’ beliefs. Three basic plots were offered in this literature. In the 
first, so-called signaling models,102 the incumbent has an informa-
tional advantage about a market feature which is key to the prey’s 
exit and output decisions—for example his own (i.e., the incumbent’s) 
production costs. The prey may infer the rival’s costs by observing 
his pricing behavior, but this is exactly where the possibility arises 
for the incumbent to bias the rival’s inferences by setting a predatory 
price in order to look like a “tough” (i.e., low-cost) competitor. How-
ever, at the equilibrium of the signaling game (a rational expectation 
equilibrium) PP does not induce the prey to either underestimate 
the profitability of continuing operation or overestimate the preda-
tor’s toughness. It follows that, according to Milgrom and Roberts’s 
story, predation does not cause the prey’s exit nor restrains its future 
price and output choices because it fails to affect its beliefs. Why 
100 J P Benoit, Financially Constrained Entry in a Game with Incomplete Informa-
tion, 15 (4) R and J Econ, 15 490–499 (1984).
101 It must be added that Benoit’s model is the weakest, theoretically speaking, 
among those of the first AIG generation. For a critique see Milgrom and J Roberts, 
New Theories of Predatory Pricing 120 (cited in note 95); M Motta, Competition Pol-
icy: Theory and Practice, 435 (Cambridge 2004).
102 P Milgrom and J Roberts, 50 Econometrica 443–459 (cited at note 79).
then should the incumbent be willing to undertake PP if it is not 
going to succeed? The answer provided by Milgrom and Roberts is 
a perfect example of the game-theoretic logic: the prey is so rational 
that it is perfectly capable of understanding the incumbent’s incen-
tives, so much so that were the latter not to prey, the former would 
conclusively infer that he is a “soft” (i.e., high-cost) competitor and 
thus would compete more aggressively against him.
A second category of AIG-based PP story is that of so-called signal- 
jamming models.103 The typical setting is that of test-marketing pre-
dation. Assume the prey is running a marketing test for a product 
to be launched in a market where the predator is already active. 
The incumbent may then try to disrupt the prey’s test by secretly 
lowering his price (say, by offering discounts to his distributors or 
loyal customers) or by undertaking any other action that may lead 
the prey to misread the test’s results and underestimate the profit-
ability of entry in that market. As in signaling models, predatory 
behavior has no effect on the prey’s equilibrium choice; once again, 
the predator fails to exclude or discipline the rival. Yet, preying is 
still mandatory for him, given the prey’s rational expectation that 
he will do it. As before, this fact may itself deter some entry, thus 
raising antitrust concerns. 
The third kind of story is perhaps the most well known and has 
to do with the incumbent’s reputation, as in Milgrom and Roberts’ 
and Kreps and Wilson’s.104 The incumbent’s goal is explicitly to 
deter future entry by preying on current rivals, regardless of whether 
his behavior actually induces the target to exit the market. The in-
formational asymmetry here is that it is private information to the 
predator whether he would undertake PP in a specific market. The 
fact that the “willingness to prey” is private information means that, 
from the prey’s viewpoint, there is a positive probability that the 
incumbent is a “natural predator”, i.e., a firm always preying upon 
his rivals. As a consequence, failure to prey once would destroy any 
reputation of being a natural predator forever, leading to future entry 
of all possible rivals. It follows that preying may be worthwhile for 
the incumbent even if it is immediately costly, since fighting entry 
today is the only way to preserve an incumbent’s reputation and 
thus deter any entry tomorrow. The natural setting for these reputa-
tion models is that of multi-market firms, where what happens in 
one market is observable by actual and potential rivals in another 
103 D Fudenberg and J Tirole, A ‘Signal-Jamming’ Theory of Predation, 17 RAND 
J Econ 366–377 (1986). 
104 P Milgrom and J Roberts, 27 J Econ Theory (cited at note 91); Kreps and Wilson, 
27 Econ Theory (cited at note 91).
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market. The more the markets, the greater the incentive to preserve 
reputation by always fighting entry. AIG reputation models thus sug-
gest that predation is a real possibility. The lack of complete infor-
mation can lead to an equilibrium where not only entry is deterred 
by predation, but predation actually must occur.105 
Preying-for-reputation, much like preying-for-signaling or preying- 
for-jamming, is a pole apart from the yes-or-no character of straight 
tests, like the ATR. Every behavior aimed at affecting a rival’s beliefs 
may vary quite a lot in breadth and intensity, but this makes much 
harder for antitrust enforcers to detect it. Moreover, the fact that 
the welfare costs of PP are said to come more from dynamic inef-
ficiency (deterrence of entry, which means undesirable obstacles to 
new investments and new products) than from static one (straight-
forward deadweight loss due to post-predation monopolization) 
makes the whole story much more debatable and the costs them-
selves extremely difficult to assess, if not purely virtual. 
To summarize, in the first half of the 1980s, a strong theoretical 
argument was developed showing that it was simply bad economics 
to argue that PP was necessarily irrational. Hence predatory behav-
ior did deserve the attention of antitrust law, as it might well be a 
real world phenomenon. Though the argument was purely theoreti-
cal, it was marketed in terms of a bouquet of plausible stories (sig-
naling, jamming, and, above all, reputation-building) which could 
be verified against the facts of actual antitrust cases. What courts 
were ideally called in to do was to look for supporting evidence for 
one of these stories and, for the rest, trust game theory as far as the 
necessary relationship between the story itself and the predatory 
nature of the firm’s behavior were concerned. Above all, no costs 
had to be estimated and no bright-line rule could be applied. Con-
trary to Areeda and Turner’s operational urge, game theory showed 
that dealing with PP cases necessarily required that courts under-
take the painstaking work of disentangling the litigation facts in 
order to bring to the surface the outline of one or the other of the 
AIG stories.
V I .  t h e  a I G  P l a y b o o k  I n  c o U r t S
It is remarkable for our narrative that the first critiques against the 
AIG methodology came from two of the authors who had contrib-
uted to its development. In their 1987 paper Milgrom and Roberts 
listes several issues that should be carefully assessed before applying 
105 See Phlips, The Economics of Imperfect of Information at 217–18 (cited at note 
98). 
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their own models’ prescriptions to law enforcement.106 First in their 
list are the stronger rationality requirements. Milgrom and Roberts 
admit that AIG agents are much more sophisticated in their infer-
ences, calculations and forecasts than in the price-theoretic world 
of competitive markets with given equilibrium prices. While it is 
obvious that the rationality standard goes up as soon as we distance 
ourselves from the world of perfect information, still what they call 
“a quantum leap” is entailed by the kind of rationality required 
for AIG. This amounts to the ability to fully anticipate the other 
players’ complex responses, including the fact that those responses 
“depend on subtle inferences that competitors draw, often by very 
intricate reasoning, from their conjectures about others’ behavior 
and their observations.”107 In short, agents in AIG models are called 
to solve more difficult decision problems than their counterparts 
in price-theoretic settings. This in turn makes the equilibrium as-
sumption more implausible. Moreover, it is natural to conclude that 
“the descriptive accuracy of the super-rationality assumption does 
seem minimal.”108
Secondly, and of utmost importance in our narrative, comes the 
dubious robustness of AIG results. Milgrom and Roberts underline 
“the apparent sensitivity of the results to alterations in what one 
might think is [the] fine structure of the models.”109 Indeed, the 
game-theoretic literature demonstrates that introducing just “a tiny 
bit of private information into such a model can radically change its 
equilibrium outcomes”110 In a sense, the AIG technique is too pow-
erful since by introducing the “right” amount of information asym-
metry, one can show that “almost anything can be made an equilib-
rium.”111 This result, formally proved by Drew Fudenberg and Eric 
Maskin, belongs to the class of Folk Theorems and has ominous 
consequences in terms of the practical applicability of AIG models 
in antitrust courts.112 
To give a hint as to what this entails (see Section 10 for further 
discussion), the result may be interpreted as indicating that PP is just 
one of the infinite possible equilibrium outcomes of a given strategic 
situation, namely, the one emerging when firms are credited with 
a very specific set of beliefs descending from a very specific kind of 
informational imperfection—precisely that set and that imperfec-
106  Milgrom and Roberts, 77 (2) Amer Econ Rev (cited at note 95).
107 Id at 188.
108 Id.
109 Id at 190.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 D Fudenberg  and E Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Dis-
counting or With Incomplete Information, 54 Econometrica, 533–554 (1986).
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tion out of an infinite array of possibilities. Borrowing from Milgrom 
and Roberts, one could then legitimately ask which of the infinite 
possibilities of informational asymmetry have “survival value”, i.e., 
correspond to a situation (technically a distribution of the predator’s 
types) to which competing firms ascribe a positive probability. Or, 
more succinctly, one could wonder whether AIG stories are really 
plausible or just conceptually possible.113 
Before digging more deeply into such a crucial issue, let’s go back 
to Milgrom and Roberts for a further questionable feature of AIG, 
when viewed as a tool for antitrust law-making. The models ana-
lyzed in Section 5 show the possible rationality of a behavior that 
is predatory in both intent and form, though not exactly the type 
of conduct traditionally termed “predatory” as it entails no neces-
sary relationship between a firm’s price and its production costs. 
Should this new species of predatory behavior be a concern for an-
titrust law? As stated before, strategic predation can be socially 
costly because of its deterrence of future entry, even if it fails to 
eliminate current rivals. Hence, Milgrom and Roberts concede that 
it would be good to prohibit it, if it could be correctly identified.114 
The problem is that in order to identify it, we should be able to rec-
ognize what is a firm’s “right” price, where “right” means, in the 
AIG context, the price that the firm would charge if the market and 
informational conditions were such as to exclude any possibility to 
affect the rivals’ behavior or beliefs. Determining such a price is, as 
Milgrom and Roberts admit, a mind-boggling problem. Hence, their 
surprising conclusion:115 “Doing so would surely cost more than any 
efficiency gain one might realize from reducing the height of dead-
weight-loss triangles. [. . .] If so, it may be best simply to give up on 
113 For economic models as merely “possible worlds.” see S Rappaport, Models 
and Reality in Economics ch 7 (Elgar 1998).  It must be added that a few advances 
on the empirical validation of AIG models of PP have been made since then. B H Ko-
bayashi, The Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, in K N Hylton, ed, Antitrust 
Law and Economics, Ch.6. (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2010); surveys this empirical 
literature, arguing that some evidence—either econometric (as in, say, Burns or Scott 
Morton) or direct (as in, say, Zerbe and Munford or Genesove and Mullin)—has been 
found in favor of the new stories, especially reputation ones.  M R Burns, Predatory 
Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94(2) J Pol Econ 266–296 (1986); 
F. Scott Morton, Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929, 6 (4) J Econ 
& Management Strategy 679–724 (1997); R O Zerbe and M T Mumford, Does Preda-
tory Pricing Exist? Economic Theory and the Courts After Brooke Group, 41 (Winter) 
Antitrust Bulletin 949–985 (1996); D Genesove and W P Mullin, Predation and its 
Rate of Return: The Sugar Industry, 1887–1914,” 37 (1) RAND J Econ 47–69 (2006).
114 P Milgrom and J Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing at 133 (cited in 
note 95).
115 All the more surprising if we think that AIG results are usually interpreted as 
conducive to a stricter enforcement of anti-PP prescriptions. See Motta, Competition 
Policy at Ch 7 (cited in note 101). 
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attempts to control predation, even if one believes that it can and 
does occur.”116
Let me summarize this argument as follows. The whole point of 
AIG is to show that PP may indeed be rational, but since PP bears 
no relation to costs (and thus to cost rules), it is impossible to iden-
tify it objectively and cheaply, therefore it is better to ignore it as 
an antitrust violation. In short, game-theoretic models demonstrate 
that the only kind of rational predation is one no antitrust court or 
authority will ever be able to detect.
The same paradoxical conclusion may be reached if we consider 
how another early supporter of AIG, industrial economist Louis 
Phlips, describes the procedure through which a court should detect 
PP behavior in actual antitrust cases. The only way a court may 
achieve a sufficient degree of certainty about a predation violation is 
by collecting evidence related to one of the AIG stories. The evidence 
need not be about whether the prey was forced out of the market or 
whether its cash flow remained positive. What should be proved, by 
either the plaintiff or the court, is that the alleged predation turned 
a profitable entry opportunity into an unprofitable one. This, notes 
Phlips, amounts to showing that, absent the incumbent’s price cut, 
there was room in the market’s normal competitive equilibrium for 
an additional firm, and that, as a result of the cut, the market price 
went below the noncooperative (i.e., Nash) equilibrium level.117 
The point is that such a proof is extremely difficult to provide in 
practice. Firstly, because AIG show that predation may occur only 
when there is sufficient uncertainty about the low price being the 
outcome of either normal competition or predatory behavior. Sec-
ondly, because the theoretical yardstick for discussing whether the 
market has enough room for an additional firm, is the post-entry 
competitive equilibrium, with its implied price and market shares. 
But how may a court effectively compute this equilibrium given 
the necessarily incomplete information about cost and/or demand? 
Phlips argues that real world firms are always capable of computing 
their own market’s Nash equilibrium, as this is the “natural out-
come” of imperfect competition under incomplete information. It 
follows that both the incumbent and the entrant should be able to 
say what the post-entry competitive price and market shares would 
have been in case of entry and no predation. The court should then 
simply discover this information and use it as the yardstick to eval-
uate the actual market performance. 
116 P Milgrom and J Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing at 134 (cited in 
note 95).
117 Phlips, The Economics of Imperfect of Information at 240–41 (cited at note 98).
302 Games judges don’t play
nicola Giocoli 303
This argument might be easily rejected by playing an Austrian 
tune and recalling that the main reason why our societies rely on 
(and defend) competition is precisely because nobody can calculate 
what the equilibrium prices would be in its absence.118 But the real 
counter-argument to Phlips is simpler than that. Leaving aside the 
firms’ actual ability to compute it, it is sufficient to recognize that 
no court or judge would ever buy the idea that an esoteric concept 
like Bayesian-Nash equilibrium119 would be the “natural outcome” 
of less-than-perfectly competitive markets; this for the very sim-
ple reason that the rationality requirements behind this and simi-
lar solution concepts are far too strong to be taken seriously in any 
real life situation. Thus, the complexity of game-theoretic models 
makes them unattractive to antitrust courts and judges eager for 
simple rules and worried about the risk of committing too many 
Type I errors, i.e., wrong condemnations of innocent, pro-competitive 
price cuts.120 Indeed, most Nash equilibrium refinements are, at best, 
just normative notions showing how ideal players, potentially capa-
ble of deploying the full power of their rationality, should behave 
(and reason) in specific strategic situations. They are, in the words 
of leading game-theoretician Ariel Rubinstein, just fables.121 But if 
the kind of game theory behind AIG is just prescriptive, how could a 
given court or judge ever apply it when deciding a concrete antitrust 
case?
That this has been the attitude in US antitrust courts may be eas-
ily demonstrated by looking at trial databases. According to Lexis, of 
the hundreds of federal cases dealing with PP indictments through 
the year 2000,122 none ever mentioned Milgrom and Roberts or Kreps 
118 H Demsetz, How Many Cheers for Antitrust’s 100 Years?, 30 (2) Economic 
Inquiry 207–217 at 215 (1992).
119 A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is defined as a strategy profile and set of beliefs 
specified for each player about the types of the other players that maximize the ex-
pected payoff for each player given their beliefs about the other players’ types and 
given the strategies played by the other players. It is a solution concept that naturally 
yields a multiplicity of equilibria in dynamic games if no further restrictions are 
placed on the players’ beliefs. As already stated, the problem of multiplicity only 
makes things worse in terms of the notion’s concrete applicability.
120 F S McChesney, Talking ’Bout my Antitrust Generation, 27 (3) Regulation 
48–55 (2004).
121 “As economic theorists, we organize our thoughts using what we call models. 
The word “model” sounds more scientific than “fable” or “fairy tale” although I do 
not see much difference between them.” A Rubinstein, Dilemmas of an Economic 
Theorist, 74 (4) Econometrica 881(2006).
122 If we consider only the cases where the words “predatory” or “predation” fea-
ture in either the case overview or core terms, there are more than 440 cases in the 
time span 1975–2000 and more than 260 from 1990 to 2000. 
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and Wilson or Benoit or Fudenberg and Tirole, or even Ordover and 
Saloner 1989’s survey on the game-theoretic approach to monopo-
lization and antitrust.123 And even turning to the predation stories 
underlying AIG, what we find is just a handful of references (four or 
five overall) to either reputation or signaling. Recalling the immedi-
ately huge impact of Areeda and Turner’s 1975 paper and its follow-
ups (see above, Section 3), we may conclude that, in terms of actual 
influence on the way US courts handle PP cases, AIG has been an 
almost complete fiasco. 
V I I .  G a m e  o V e r :  B r o o k e  a n d  t h e  
t r I U m P h  o F  t h e  c h I c a G o  S c h o o l 
In the previous Sections we have explained how things radically 
(and quickly) changed in both the doctrinal environment and the 
lower courts’ attitude after the publication of Areeda and Turner’s 
1975 article. It is now time to complete our story, by illustrating 
when and how the transformation reached the Supreme Court. The 
first application by the Supreme Court of the ideas emerging from 
the debate on the various price/cost rules came in 1986, with the 
Matsushita decision.124 There, the Court endorsed the principle that 
a charge of predatory behavior had to be supported by evidence on 
the relationship between the defendant’s price and cost, along the 
lines of the post-ATR literature. Moreover, as a second requirement, 
the plaintiff had to show if and how the predator, after excluding its 
rival(s), could make up for the sacrifice of short-term profits suffered 
during the period of below-cost pricing—the so-called recoupment 
test, which a few years later became the hallmark of another crucial 
decision, Brooke.125
In the latter case, the Court did something unprecedented in anti-
trust cases, that is to say, it set aside a jury verdict based on a review 
of the sufficiency of the evidence, and explicitly declared that plain-
123 J A Ordover and G Saloner, Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust, in R 
Schmalensee and R D Willig, The Handbook of Industrial Economics at 537–596 
(North-Holland, Amsterdam 1989).
124 Matsushita Elec Indus Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574 (1986).
125 Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209 (1993). 
Glazer downplays the novelty of the recoupment test in Brooke, saying that after 
Matsushita the requirement was “yesterday’s news”, so much so that the Brooke 
plaintiff (that Glazer himself represented during all stages of the litigation) easily 
accepted the need to prove recoupment—and even succeeded at that. K L Glazer, 
Predatory Pricing and Beyond: Life after Brooke Group, 62 Antitrust L J 605–633 
fn 13 (1994).
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tiffs in a PP case must not only show that the defendant has a genu-
ine possibility of preying upon the rival, by either forcing its exit or 
disciplining it, but also that the defendant has a strong prospect of 
recouping the losses suffered during predation.126 Specifically, the 
Brooke Court stated that, firstly, PP requires proof of below-cost 
pricing (though no specific cost rule was referred to)127 and, secondly, 
that PP requires proof of recoupment. Hence, below-cost pricing is 
just a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for monopolization. 
In order to satisfy the second requirement, plaintiffs must not only 
prove that below-cost pricing either excludes or disciplines the prey, 
but also that the predator will afterwards be able to raise the price 
above the competitive level and that this will compensate him for 
the losses during the predatory phase. 
The recoupment test itself entails two different elements of proof. 
The plaintiff must demonstrate not only that the successful preda-
tor has been, or will be, able to raise price above the competitive 
level (so-called recoupment capability), but also that the increase 
has been, or will be, sufficient to compensate the predator for its 
predatory losses (so-called recoupment sufficiency). Moreover, in 
order to prove the actual, or prospective, profitability of predation, 
plaintiffs are required to demonstrate as a necessary precondition 
that the market structure is such as to potentially allow recoup-
ment in the first place—something that in turn calls for, at the very 
least, a proof of structural features such as market concentration, 
existence of entry barriers and the predator’s capacity to absorb the 
prey’s market share.128 The accusation will be summarily dismissed 
absent the demonstration of the proper structural conditions, or of 
any other of the various prongs of what, after 1993, has been called 
the Brooke test. Far from being inconsistent with, or in opposition 
to, the ATR and its variants, the recoupment test has actually pro-
vided defendants in PP cases with a second, alternative weapon. 
After 1993 a defendant can prevail in summary judgment by win-
ning in either the recoupment or the price-cost section of the Brooke 
test.129
126 More precisely, that a “dangerous probability” of recoupment exists if the case 
is a Sherman Act §2 violation, while a “reasonable prospect” of recoupment is re-
quired if the case is a Robinson-Patman Act, anti-price discrimination violation. Mat-
sushita was an instance of the former, Brooke of the latter.
127 It was just required that price be below “some measure of incremental cost.” 
Brooke, 509 US at 223. 
128 Bolton et al, 88 Georgetown L J at 2255–56 (cited in note 23).
129 Hovenkamp, 41 Antitrust Bulletin at 833 (cited at note 46).  The fact itself of 
applying summary judgment to an antitrust case—a solution explicitly disfavored by 
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What makes Brooke so important for our story is that it was the 
first time since the ATR “revolution” that the Court made its own 
views about PP fully explicit. These consisted of a strong skepticism 
about the robustness of predation claims, and a true sea-change from 
the Court’s earlier idea of competition as such a fragile process that 
it had to be protected from any significant price reduction made by 
big firms.130 Indeed, the Brooke Court went much farther than the 
simple endorsement of either the ATR or one of its variants.131 Not 
even the observation of below-cost pricing, combined with the theo-
retical possibility of recouping (which, as we know, is by itself quite 
unlikely), should be considered sufficient to validate an accusation 
of predatory behavior absent convincing truth proof of the actual 
likelihood of sustained supra-competitive pricing and recoupment. 
Hence, as noted by Kobayashi132, the idea was explicitly rejected that 
the mere theoretical possibility of welfare harm could provide a basis 
for antitrust liability. The Court noted that, although the plaintiff’s 
economic expert had presented a theory of predatory price discrimi-
nation133 and had affirmed his belief that, according to that theory, 
a reasonable possibility existed that the defendant’s behavior might 
have injured competition, “this does not alter our analysis. When 
an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient facts to validate it 
in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable record facts contradict 
the Supreme Court in Poller v CBS, 368 US 467, 473 (1962), heralded a sea-change in 
jurisprudential attitude towards antitrust violations. See Hovenkamp, 41 Antitrust 
Bulletin at 822 (cited at note 46).  Even the much-debated Twombly decision by the 
2007 Supreme Court (on which see below, Section 8.2) may be considered as a fur-
ther step in this direction. Richard Epstein speaks of Twombly as establishing “sum-
mary judgment in disguise.” R A Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on 
Twombly and Iqbal with Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 (1) U Ill L Rev187–213 
(2011).
130 D J Boudreaux, K G Elzinga and D E Mills, The Supreme Court’s Predation Od-
yssey: From Fruit Pies to Cigarettes, 4 S Ct Econ Rev 57–93 at 72. Glazer notes that 
the Brooke plaintiff’s case was very strong, so much so that the decision, as well as 
the Court’s willingness to take a procedurally unusual step, says a lot about the lat-
ter’s general attitude towards PP.  K L Glazer, 62 Antitrust L J at 606  (cited at note 
125.
131 Though Areeda and Turner themselves had briefly mentioned the recoupment 
test in their paper: “predatory pricing would make little economic sense to a poten-
tial predator unless he had [. . .] a very substantial prospect that the losses he incurs 
in the predatory campaign will be exceeded by the profits to be earned after his rivals 
have been destroyed.” Areeda and Turner, 88(4) Harv L Rev at 698 (cited in note 1) 
(1975 article).
132 Kobayashi, Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing (cited in note 113).
133 Recall that Brooke was a Robinson-Patman case. See note 125.
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or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a 
jury’s verdict.”134 
As we already know, the most visible outcome of Brooke has 
been that, after 1993, no plaintiff has won a PP case at federal court 
level: a 0% condemnation rate in 39 PP federal cases from 1993 to 
2000. It is not hard to see why. As noted by Bolton et al.135, the com-
bination of the exacting standard of proof set by the Brooke Court, 
plus the theoretical skepticism that PP could be a plausible business 
strategy, plus the judicial neglect of modern strategic theories of PP 
(of the kind analyzed in the previous Sections), easily explains the 
plaintiffs’ miserable success rate after 1993—which in turn validated 
Glazer’s dismal prophecy for the future of PP as an antitrust viola-
tion.136 In short, after Brooke price cuts made by dominant firms 
have once again become de facto legal in the US, as had previously 
happened immediately after the ATR. 
But where did the Brooke test come from? What brought the 1993 
Court to completely reverse its 1960s attitude? In particular, given 
that the role of the recoupment test is precisely to warrant that no PP 
accusation may end up deterring competitive behavior,137 where did 
the Court take the very idea that some competitive practices may 
exist which, though potentially harmful, could not be condemned 
without causing more damage to other, surely pro-competitive con-
ducts? 
The obvious answer is that this view, first developed by the Court 
in Matsushita and then fully formalized in Brooke, marked the tri-
umph of the Chicago School in United States antitrust law. Evi-
dence in favor of this interpretation is abundant in both decisions. 
According to the Matsushita Court, predatory strategies are implau-
sible in terms of economic theory because they are unlikely to work 
and especially costly when failing. It follows that, as McGee had 
already put it (see above, §2.4), “predatory pricing schemes are rarely 
tried, and even more rarely successful.”138 Moreover, given that cut-
ting prices in order to increase business is recognized as “the very 
essence of competition“, it turns out that “mistaken inferences in 
cases like this one are especially costly, because they chill the very 
conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”139 Therefore, “if 
134 Brooke Group Ltd, 509 US at 242.
135 Bolton et al, 88 Georgetown L J at 2258–59 (cited in note 23).
136 Glazer, 62 Antitrust L J at 633 (cited in note 125).
137 According to Hovenkamp, 41 Antitrust Bulletin, at 836 (cited in note 46), prov-
ing that the possibility of recoupment is concrete is tantamount to saying that PP is 
rational behavior, and thus likely to occur in that specific situation.
138 Matsushita Elec Indus, 475 US at 589.
139 Id at 594.
308 Games judges don’t play
“the factual context renders respondents’ claim implausible—if the 
claim is one that simply makes no economic sense—respondents 
must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their 
claim than would otherwise be necessary.”140 The point that vali-
dating loose PP accusations would risk deterring pro-competitive 
behavior is made even more forcefully by the Brooke Court: “As a 
general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant mea-
sure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged 
predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond 
the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting 
intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price cutting.”141 
As we know well, the central argument of  Chicago critique against 
PP was at the same time theoretical and practical. Accordingly, the 
Matsushita Court referred to “a consensus among commentators”, 
quoting in support of its position the full line-up of Chicago anti-
PP classics, from McGee to Bork, from Koller to Easterbrook, plus 
the ever-present Areeda and Turner.142 From here, it is just a small 
step to identify as the main inspiration for the many hurdles set in 
front of a PP accusation by the Brooke Court one of Chicago main 
“articles of faith.”143  I refer to the belief that courts and agencies 
are very insecure when it comes to policing competition—in other 
words, that US antitrust law is founded on the principle that market 
processes are usually superior to legal or administrative processes in 
the task of allocating scarce resources. Consistently with this strong 
belief, antitrust law should proscribe only those behaviors that are 
flagrantly anti-competitive, leaving to other parts of the law (either 
property, contract or tort law) and to incentive-guided market behav-
ior the protection and enhancement of total welfare. The Court in 
Matsushita and Brooke simply endorsed this point of view. 
It follows that the recoupment test was established as the best 
functional screen for PP cases. Asking whether recoupment is fea-
sible under the plaintiff’s theory of predation is in fact a much sim-
pler question than the—only apparently—straightforward one: “is 
the defendant’s price below an appropriate measure of its cost?”144 
Recoupment analysis requires less information than price-cost com-
parisons because a single finding, such as “other competitors exist” 
140 Id at 587.
141 Brooke Group Ltd, 509 US at 223.
142 Matsushita Elec Indus, 475 US at 589.
143 D Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 Univ Chic L Rev 1911, 
1929 (2009).
144 Boudreaux et al, 4 S Ct Econ Rev at 72 (cited at note 130).
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or “entry into the market is easy” or “customers may undertake ef-
fective counterstrategies”, is sufficient to invalidate the test and 
thus, lead to the summary dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim—leaving 
the final word to the market, in line with the core tenets of Chicago 
economics.
The irony of Brooke145 is that the Court went so far in its decision 
and established such a harsh standard that the plaintiff lost the case 
despite having substantially demonstrated that the defendant had 
actually engaged in a successful predation strategy. This, according 
to Glazer,146 entailed a very un-Chicago claim of the superiority of 
the Court’s knowledge over that of market participants themselves. 
Indeed, the Brooke plaintiff accepted the need to prove a plausible 
recoupment scenario, presented evidence and expert testimony 
about the objective characteristics of the market showing how the 
defendant could realistically recoup the losses of the predatory phase 
designed to discipline his rival, and even relied on documented mar-
ket analysis by the defendant’s own management, showing that the 
latter materially acted (by investing millions of dollars) on the belief 
that a predatory campaign would create a reasonable possibility of 
lessening competition–in short, the plaintiff had provided the Brooke 
Court with both the “story” and the “intent.”147 The fact that it lost 
anyway means, among other things, post-Brooke courts need no 
longer defer to the informed judgment of market agents.148 This 
obviously clashes with the above-mentioned “article of faith” for 
Chicago economics: “the Court’s willingness to assume that a so-
phisticated marketplace actor [the defendant] did not know what it 
was doing and was, in essence, acting irrationally is actually at odds 
with the Chicago School’s reliance on the wisdom of marketplace 
actors.”149 So strong was the 1993 Court’s persuasion (fully in line 
with Chicago views) against the validity of PP claims that a find-
ing of violation was precluded, no matter what the evidence might 
reveal about the defendant’s intent and behavior and no matter what 
145 At least according to the admittedly very partial reading of Glazer, 62 Antitrust 
L J at 633 (cited at note 125).
146 Id at 623.
147 Id at 625.
148 “Brooke Group gives courts license to ignore such evidence [about market 
agents’ knowledge] when it conflicts with their own convictions about what will 
happen in the marketplace. It tells them that they need not be influenced by the 
marketplace actors themselves.” Id at 626.
149 Id. To add further irony, the plaintiff, in the effort to uphold the relevance of 
the defendant’s beliefs and conduct, relied on the scholarship of no less than Chicago 
champion Frank Easterbrook: see id at 626, fn 103.
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the decision might entail for the broad issue of where market knowl-
edge actually resides.
V I I I .  k I l l I n G  G a m e S :  P a r t  I I  a n d  I I I
The following pages deal with two other possible explanations for 
the post-1980 Supreme Court jurisprudence on PP cases, and in par-
ticular of its failure to take into account the novel ideas coming from 
game theory and the so-called Post-Chicago approach to antitrust.150 
These are not intended to deny the validity of the most traditional 
explanation offered in the previous section, but rather to integrate 
it, by showing that the straightforward equation “Matsushita & 
Brooke = Chicago antitrust law and economics” does not tell the 
whole story. 
a. The first alternative reading is suggested by Bill Kovacic in a 
2007 Columbia Business Law Review paper, where he emphasizes 
the role played in the development of PP antitrust law by three fa-
mous Harvard law scholars such as Areeda, Turner and, above all, 
Stephen Breyer151 
As noticed before, the recoupment notion had already been briefly 
mentioned by Areeda and Turner in their 1975 classic, and the paper 
itself was explicitly mentioned by the Supreme Court among the 
doctrinal sources of Matsushita. But according to Kovacic, even more 
influential on the latter decision has been the then-judge Breyer’s 
1983 ruling in Barry Wright152. There Breyer had explicitly endorsed 
the policy trade-off between the short and long term effects of pre-
dation which had animated the post-ATR debate, see above, Sec-
tion 3.2. Yet, his “standard” concern with the possible deterrence 
of pro-competitive behavior caused by too strict an enforcement 
of anti-PP law did not stem in that decision from the same kind 
150 This name characterizes an approach to antitrust law and economics that aims 
at replacing the Chicago School as the leading theoretical engine for the application 
of economic theory to competition policy and enforcement. The analytical back-
bone of the Post-Chicago approach is provided by game theory in general, and by 
AIG in particular. A 1989 paper by Baker is considered the informal manifesto of the 
approach. J B Baker, Recent Developments in Economics That Challenge Chicago 
School Views, 58 Antitrust Law J, 645–655 (1989). On Post-Chicago law and econom-
ics see A Cucinotta, R  Pardolesi and R Van den Bergh, eds, Post-Chicago Develop-
ments in Antitrust Law (2002 Edward Elgar); R Pitofsky, ed, How the Chicago School 
Overshot the Mark (Oxford 2008).
151 Kovacic, 1 Columbia Business at 1–81 (cited in note 9). A Harvard law professor 
since 1967 and a judge on the First Circuit Court of Appeals since 1980, Stephen G. 
Breyer has been appointed in 1994 as Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court. 
152  Barry Wright Corp v ITT Grinnell Corp, 724 F2d 227 (1st Cir 1983). Kovacic, 
1 Columbia Business at 48–9 (cited in note 9).
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of preoccupations of Chicago economists. It rather came out from 
the very feeling that had motivated Areeda and Turner in 1975 see 
above, Section 2, namely, the fear that courts and antitrust agencies 
often lacked the ability to handle difficult antitrust cases and, con-
sequently, that antitrust law might suffer serious credibility losses 
from too many unsound decisions.153 
Kovacic claims that caution about the administrability of rules 
and the capacity of antitrust institutions to implement them have 
been the main contributions of Harvard Law School to modern 
US antitrust. Though sharing the general concern about deter-
rence effects,154 Harvard preoccupation was not identical to Chi-
cago’s. While the latter had a theoretical (one would say, ideologi-
cal) foundation in the alleged superiority of markets in allocating 
scarce resources with respect to every other institution, the former 
addressed the practical side of antitrust law enforcement. It follows 
that the Brooke test may be read, at least in part, as the outcome 
of Harvard scholars’ insistence that competition policy should take 
into account the limitations of US antitrust institutions, and thus 
give prominence to a few simple and fully operational principles 
that all courts and agencies may easily apply.155
Kovacic’s thesis is confirmed by taking a closer look at Justice 
Breyer’s antitrust doctrine.156 First as a judge in the Court of Appeals 
of the First Circuit and then as a member of the Supreme Court, 
Breyer has always decided, in antitrust cases, in favor of bright-line 
rules and safe harbors whenever the benefits of exhaustive anal-
153 In his tribute to the memory of Donald Turner, Breyer wrote that from the mid- 
1960s “it was becoming increasingly apparent that, to create coherent antitrust pol-
icy, reliance upon statute, precedent and instinct alone would not work. Unless in-
formed by economics, disciplined with intellectual rigor, and administered with an 
understanding of industrial practicality, enforcement of the antitrust laws risked un-
certainty, economic hardship, and injuring the very consumers they were meant to 
protect.” S G Breyer, 41 Antitrust Bulletin, at 725 (cited at note 29).
154 The passage of Breyer’s Barry Wright quoted by the Supreme Court is indeed 
that: “[w]e must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for 
a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging legitimate 
price competition.” Matsushita Elec Indus, 475 US at 594.
155 Similarly, Bruce Kobayashi argues that, far from pushing towards an accurate 
and economically sophisticated measure of the profit sacrifice incurred by an alleged 
predator, the Court’s real purpose in Brooke was to make clear that antitrust enforc-
ers have to accept that their measurement tools are too imprecise to evaluate a firm’s 
business strategy without creating an intolerable risk of deterring pro-competitive 
behavior. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing (cited in note 113). 
Here, according to Kobayashi, lies a possible explanation for the failure of sophisti-
cated game-theoretic models to affect US courts’ attitude towards PP, a point we will 
return to in the following pages. 
156 See L B Greenfield and D J Matheson, Rules Versus Standards and the Antitrust 
Jurisprudence of Justice Breyer, 23(3) Antitrust 87–91 (2009).
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ysis, using all the available economic tools, would not justify the 
costs. Barry Wright is exemplary in this regard. In that ruling Breyer 
rejected an allegation of “unreasonably low price”, establishing a 
bright-line rule which—in the same spirit of ATR—effectively im-
munized from antitrust scrutiny any price that exceeded both incre-
mental and average cost, thus providing a major channel for bringing 
Areeda and Turner’s proposal into mainstream antitrust jurispru-
dence, including the Supreme Court’s. 
In the same decision, Breyer also rejected a Ninth Circuit test 
developed in another PP case that admitted that even a price exceed-
ing average total cost could be predatory if it had been used strategi-
cally in order to discipline competition.157 Crucially, the test was 
not dismissed via a theoretical argument (say, because price theory 
proved that pricing above ATC could never harm consumers), but 
rather on the claim that any rare instance of possible welfare loss 
caused by such a price did not justify the costs of the fully-fledged 
rule of reason analysis required to undertake the test. Far from de-
nying that antitrust enforcement could enormously benefit from the 
insights and rigor of economic theory, Breyer remarked that: “while 
technical economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws, 
those laws cannot precisely replicate the economists’ (sometimes 
conflicting) views. For, unlike economics, law is an administrative 
system the effects of which depend upon the content of rules and 
precedents only as they are applied by judges and juries in courts 
and by lawyers advising their clients.”158 These words immediately 
preceded the famous passage where Breyer argued that he did not 
want, for the sake of pursuing every economic complexity and quali-
fication, to risk sacrificing the “bird in hand” of above-cost price 
cuts, surely benefiting consumers in the short run, for the “bird in 
the bush” of possible lower prices in the long run.159 Such a clear 
vision of the policy tradeoff, inevitable in every PP case, between 
sure short term gains and potential longer term gains has been 
very influential in US antitrust jurisprudence. Indeed, themes from 
Breyer’s First Circuit opinions have profoundly affected some of the 
most significant Supreme Court’s antitrust decisions over the last 
twenty years.160 
157 Note that, in confirmation of the early development of (informal) strategic argu-
ments, such a Ninth Circuit test actually predated AIG. William Inglis & Sons Bak-
ing Co v ITT Continental Baking Co, 668 F2d 1014, 1035 (9th Cir, 1981).
158 Barry Wright, 724 F2d at 234, emphasis added (cited in note 152).
159 Id.
160 Starting from the early 1990s, the Court has ruled in favor of defendants in an 
unbroken line of antitrust case. Several of these decisions adopted a “safe harbor” 
approach protecting the defendant’s conduct that was clearly inspired by the Barry 
Wright doctrine. For example, the Matsushita Court cited the “bird in hand” prin-
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The suggested interpretation finds further support in Breyer’s 
voting pattern as a Supreme Court Justice. An institutionalist per-
spective on the comparative competence in decision-making and 
an overall leaning towards technocracy seem to motivate his deci-
sions. For example, in Trinko161 he concurred with Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in expressing a preference for regulatory decision making 
by administrative agencies, rather than antitrust enforcement by 
generalist judges, on account of the superior competence of the for-
mer with respect to the latter. In Leegin,162 his dissent in favor of 
rules rather than standards was motivated on the ground that juries 
may have difficulty in applying open-ended and economically dense 
standards. 
One may legitimately ask whether Justice Breyer’s rule-based 
antitrust jurisprudence is merely synonymous with pro-defendant. 
The answer is negative, as Breyer’s message in Barry Wright was 
simply that definite rules should be applied in appropriate cases— 
a message that does not necessarily lead to systematically pro- 
defendant outcomes in antitrust litigations. The real issue upon 
which Breyer has exercised his enormous influence is that a court’s 
choice between bright-line rules and more open-ended inquiries (aka, 
stories) should depend on considerations that have nothing to do 
with the problem of whether a given conduct (say, a price cut) is 
or is not anti-competitive. As he famously stated in another First Cir-
cuit decision: “We shall take into account of the institutional fact 
that antitrust rules are court-administered rules. They must be clear 
enough for lawyers to explain them to clients. They must be admin- 
istratively workable and therefore cannot always tsake account of 
every complex economic circumstance or qualification.”163 What 
matters most here, Breyer’s opinions seem to have little to do with 
the Harvard vs. Chicago controversy that in so many historical recon-
structions represents the main driving force of the evolution of US 
antitrust law in the last 30–40 years.164
ciple to emphasize the dangers of mistaken inferences in PP litigations. The Court 
then reiterated the same concern in Cargill and, later, in Brooke. Even the controver-
sial—and eventually withdrawn—Section 2 Report by the US Department of Justice 
(2008), which aimed at harmonizing the DOJ enforcement of anti-monopolization 
statutes with the most widely accepted legal doctrine and economic theory, echoed 
many of the themes of Breyer’s jurisprudence and quoted Barry Wright more than 
ten times.
161 Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP, 540 US 
398 (2004).
162 Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc v PSKS Inc, 551 US 877 (2007).
163 Town of Concord v Boston Edison Co, 915 F2d 17, 22 (1st Cir 1990).
164 See Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, at 1918–1920 (cited at 
143). Concerning Trinko, Kovacic underlines how the ideas contained in Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion are hardly the outcome of Chicago School thinking alone 
b. The other alternative reading of Matsushita and Brooke hinges 
upon the internal logic of Supreme Court’s decisions. The recon-
struction starts in 1984, when the Court argued in Monsanto165—a 
Sherman Act §1 conspiracy case—that a single piece of circumstan-
tial evidence that could have resulted from either a conspiracy or 
independent behavior was insufficient for a plaintiff to survive a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The general prin-
ciple was that, for a plaintiff to defeat a motion for a directed ver-
dict under a claim of concerted price fixing, evidence had to be pre-
sented, either direct or circumstantial, that “tends to exclude the 
possibility” that the alleged conspirators acted independently.166 In 
other words, whenever the circumstantial evidence produced by the 
plaintiff might have been caused by pro-competitive behavior, the 
Court required that the “tends to exclude” principle be satisfied in 
order to avoid deterring firms from undertaking a legitimate, pro- 
efficiency behavior.167
The Monsanto principle reveals that the “avoid chilling competi-
tive behavior” argument pre-dates Matsushita. In his lengthy study 
of the latter decision, Nickolai Levin notes that the principle itself 
may well have been the outcome of the rise of Chicago antitrust 
scholarship, as well as of the Court’s Harvard-style desire to employ 
economics in order to revive and strengthen antitrust law.168 Yet, he 
also underlines that later decisions, such as Matsushita, should be 
read first and foremost as the Court’s effort to delimit and clarify 
the meaning of the Monsanto principle. In particular, Matsushita 
should be seen as the effort to extend the principle to a summary 
judgment context in a PP case. As the Court put it: “To survive a 
motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff 
seeking damages for a violation of [Sherman Act] §1 must present 
evidence that ‘tends to exclude the possibility’ that the alleged con-
spirators acted independently. Respondents [. . .] must show that the 
inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing infer-
ences of independent action or collusive action that could not have 
(allegedly championed in the Court by Scalia himself) and should be more correctly 
considered the product of a Scalia/Breyer collaboration.  Kovacic, 1 Columbia Busi-
ness, at 67–8 (cited in note 9).
165 Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite Serv Corp, 465 US 752 (1984).
166 Id at 753.
167 “It is of considerable importance that independent action by the manufacturer, 
and concerted action on nonprice restrictions, be distinguished from price-fixing 
agreements, since, under present law, the latter are subject to per se treatment and 
treble damages.” Id at 763; also see N G Levin, The Nomos and Narrative of Matsu-
shita, 73 Fordham L Rev 7–1710, 1630 (2005).
168 Levin, 73 Fordham L Rev at 1630 (cited in note 167).
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harmed respondents.”169 Hence, a new requirement of “reasonable 
in the light of competing inferences” was developed by the Court, 
which immediately applied it to the PP case under scrutiny. Cutting 
prices being the very essence of competition, there obviously existed 
a possible inference of pro-competitive behavior in the light of the 
observed price reduction, so much so that the motion for summary 
judgment could not be survived by the Matsushita plaintiff. 
A few lines before the above-quoted passage, the Court had also 
argued that: “if the factual context renders respondents’ claim 
implausible—if the claim is one that simply makes no economic 
sense—respondents must come forward with more persuasive evi-
dence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary.”170 
The combination of the two passages leads Levin to read into the 
new, “reasonable in the light of competing inferences” principle the 
Court’s clarification that the Monsanto “tends to exclude” doctrine 
also applies to plausible allegations. Even in front of a plausible infer-
ence of antitrust violation, there may still exist a pro-competitive 
explanation for the same behavior. 
Levin’s remark is crucial for our narrative. Not surprisingly, these 
two key passages immediately precede the fourth section of Matsu-
shita decision, namely, the pages where the Court openly addressed 
Chicago scholarship in order to explain why PP schemes had to be 
considered implausible on the basis of rigorous economic theory.171 
With the explicit reference to Chicago doctrine, the Matsushita 
Court set forth a new definition of “reasonableness.”172 Starting from 
1986, the term “reasonable” incorporates what Levin calls “a case-
external dimension”, that is to say, the idea that the reasonableness 
of any specific inference in an antitrust case also depends on how 
allowing the inference might affect, or deter, market competition 
in general. It is in this specific sense that Matsushita is commonly 
said to have established a gate-keeping role for courts in antitrust 
cases.173 Judges and juries are required to assess the reasonableness 
of plaintiff’s inferences and, in doing so, they also have to take into 
account the external effect on social welfare and market efficiency 
of admitting, or rejecting, a certain inference.
The new dimension of reasonableness is confirmed by the sev-
eral Circuit courts which, using the gate-keeping power granted to 
them by Matsushita, have limited admissible inferences of harmful 
169 Matsushita Elec Indus, 475 US at 587–88, emphasis added.
170 Id at 587.
171  Id at 589 ff.
172 Levin, 73 Fordham L Rev at 1632 (cited at note 167).
173 D A Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 Washington & 
Lee L Rev 49–110, 77 (2007).
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business behavior.174 Yet, the interpretation of the joint Monsanto-
Matsushita principle is still an open issue in American law. Does 
the “tends to exclude” requirement applies to all antitrust cases? 
Does it apply only to implausible inferences? Or does it apply only 
when there is a significant risk of deterring pro-competitive behav-
ior? Take the second (“implausibility only”) reading. This would 
fit nicely with what the Matsushita Court thought of PP stories, 
inasmuch as, following Chicago doctrine, predation turns out to be 
a strategy that no rational, profit-maximizing firm would ever pur-
sue. However, following Levin and recalling that the Court verba-
tim extended the Monsanto principle to plausible inferences, it is 
the third (“deterrence only”) reading that seems more respectful of 
the Court’s decisions, as the latter aimed at establishing a precau-
tionary requirement against the case-external risk of causing wel-
fare losses by chilling pro-competitive behavior.175 
174 For a partial list of PP cases see Crane, 64 Washington & Lee L Rev at 78 & fn 
122 (cited in note 173).  Crane notes that the gate-keeping role has been mainly exer-
cised in cases involving the application of per se rules, first and foremost PP cases. 
175 The latter reading may also account for the Supreme Court decision in East-
man Kodak Co v Image Technical Services Inc, 504 US 451 (1992). In Kodak—a tying 
case—the Court seemingly sided with Post-Chicago in that it argued that imperfect 
information alone may suffice to destroy an otherwise competitive market, thereby 
somehow equating imperfect information to other, more traditional anti-competitive 
features, such as a big market share. R H Lande, Chicago Takes it on the Chin: Imper-
fect Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 Antitrust 
L J 193–202, 194–95 (1993). Levin reinterprets Kodak as an outcome of the Court’s 
internal logic, in particular of its effort to clarify the extent of the Monsanto/Mat-
sushita principle. According to him, the Kodak Court just gave a specific solution 
to the procedural issue left open by Matsushita, namely, “how often” an observed 
business behavior had to be pro-competitive in order to trigger the inference limita-
tion of the original Monsanto principle and thus lead a court to “shut the gate” in 
the plaintiff’s face. The answer was that it was not sufficient for the behavior to be 
generally more favorable than harmful to competition, because, as the Kodak Court 
stated, the Monsanto principle of limitation could only be invoked when the behav-
ior was “always, or almost always” pro-competitive.  Levin, 73 Fordham L Rev at 
1632 (cited at note 167).  Remarkably for our narrative, the Court considered cutting 
prices to be precisely one such case, and thus classified PP as a paradigmatic exam-
ple of—to borrow Levin’s term—theoretical implausibility, i.e., of an inference that 
might even be factually plausible were it not for current economic theory clearly 
indicating that it was very unlikely correct. Id at 1695. Levin’s interpretation also 
leads to a new reading of Brooke (see main text), as this decision would represent 
the Court’s solution to the new issues raised by Kodak. In any case, and regardless of 
Levin’s reconstruction, much of the bolder Post-Chicago claims triggered by Kodak 
have been watered down in the following years by lower courts. D A J Goldfine and 
K M Vorrasi, The Fall of the Kodak Aftermarket Doctrine: Dying a Slow Death in the 
Lower Courts, 72 Antitrust L J 209–231 (2005). For a different way Kodak may still 
help the game-theoretic approach to PP see Bolton et al, 88 Georgetown L J at 2000, 
2265 (cited in note 23).
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In terms of Levin’s interpretation, it came naturally that Brooke’s 
hallmark, the recoupment test, established a sharp differentiation 
between PP and every other instance of exclusionary conduct. In 
the latter, the inference of injury to competition may be drawn by 
simply looking at the conduct itself and at market structure. In pre-
dation cases—and only in them—a further requirement must be 
satisfied. The fact that an accusation of PP was seen by the 1993 
Court as the only instance of “investment in the creation of market 
power” by a dominant firm that called forth a much tighter stan-
dard of proof, may thus be read as the Court’s willingness to clarify 
that PP cases epitomize precisely that danger of deterring virtuous 
marketplace behavior. Hence, rather than embodying the judicial 
byproduct of any epic clash amongst competing law and economics 
schools (Harvard, Chicago, Post-Chicago), the whole sequence Mon-
santo—Matsushita—Brooke176 would simply represent the physi-
ological outcome of the evolution, and clarification, of the Supreme 
Court’s antitrust jurisprudence.177
Another, more recent decision seems to further corroborate this 
sequence. In Twombly, an antitrust conspiracy case,178 the Court 
transplanted its Matsushita principle concerning summary judgment 
standards to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Under 
the procedural standard set forth in Conley,179 a complaint need 
only state facts that made it “conceivable” that it could prove its 
legal claim. This meant that a court could only dismiss a claim if it 
appeared, beyond any doubt, that plaintiffs would be able to prove 
“no set of facts” in support of their claim. The Twombly Court 
reneged this principle, stating that plaintiffs must allege “enough 
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”, i.e., that 
their claims must be capable to “[c]ross the line from conceivable to 
plausible.”180  In the specific case under scrutiny, the Court argued 
that the complaint could not be based on mere allegations of parallel 
176 A sequence to which, according to Levin, Kodak should also be added. See the 
previous note.
177 One may legitimately ask why the Brooke Court did not make one step further 
and establish the per se lawfulness of every price cut by non-collusive firms. For ex-
ample, Boudreaux, Elzinga and Mills argue that, following the Supreme Court’s own 
justification of per se rules (i.e., that rules should be preferred to standards whenever 
the risk of possible welfare losses are clearly outweighed by the sum of potential 
gains plus the sure savings of administrative costs), Brooke should have contained a 
rule legalizing price cuts.  Boudreaux et al, 4 S Ct Econ Rev at 76–8 (cited in note 130); 
Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209 (1993).
178 Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544 (2007). I thank one of the referees 
for having directed my attention to this further element of the sequence.
179 Conley v Gibson, 335 US 41 (1957).
180  Twombly, 550 US at 570.
conduct because the plaintiff was required to set forth a factual con-
text which would allow truly unlawful behavior, i.e., conspiracy, to 
be distinguished from lawful one, i.e., parallel independent action.
The decision has triggered a vast debate about the reduced acces-
sibility to the legal system for plaintiffs who might be forced to incur 
uncompensated, fact-finding costs prior to filing suit.181 But even 
in the more limited realm of antitrust law the impact of Twombly 
is potentially huge.182 The Matsushita Court had stated that if the 
plaintiff cannot reasonably exclude the possibility that the defen-
dant was acting legally, the judge should not let the case go to the 
jury. Yet, in that decision the plaintiff had still been granted the 
opportunity to conduct discovery. In the effort to avoid those expen-
sive “fishing expeditions” for discovery which may make Sherman 
Act private litigations especially burdensome, the Twombly Court 
decided to raise the bar for antitrust plaintiffs, thereby reducing the 
room for costly private antitrust lawsuits.183 Avoidance of litiga-
tion per se was considered by the 2007 Court a sufficiently worthy 
goal to restrict court access to plaintiffs by explicitly requiring that 
antitrust complaints must be endowed with factual enhancement 
in order to cross the line between possibility and plausibility. This 
not only on account of the high costs of antitrust discovery, but also 
because of the concern for the potential chilling effects on competi-
tive behavior which may descend from allowing private plaintiffs 
too easily a recourse to antitrust lawsuits.184 The requirement of fac-
181 See, for example, Epstein, 2011 (1) U Ill L Rev at 187–213 (cited in note 129) and 
the literature and case law cited therein.
182 Two articles, by Keyte and by Anderson and Huffman, show how the Twombly 
principle has been applied to the pleading standards of every type of antitrust claims. 
J A Keyte, Twombly: How Courts are Interpreting and Extending its Principles, 23 
(Fall) Antitrust 65–71 (2009); M Anderson and M Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the 
Expected Cost of False Positive Error, 20 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 1–66 (2011).
183 See R C Picker, Twombly, Leegin and the Reshaping of Antitrust, John M. Olin 
Law & Economics Working Papers, Univ of Chicago, at 4  n.389 (2008).  The decision 
may be criticized in that it seems to neglect that for several antitrust violations the 
complaint may, almost by definition, offer little more that the plaintiff’s belief that 
the defendant behavior was illegal. Given that the defendant’s intent, in a conspiracy 
case, or his production costs, in a predation case, are always private information, this 
belief may only be confirmed if discovery is allowed. Id at19. To this critique, Rich-
ard Epstein has countered that the Twombly principle empowers courts to dismiss 
only factually implausible complaints, i.e., only the limited subset of antitrust cases 
where actual discovery would really make no sense. As an example of the latter, 
Epstein mentions PP because these are cases where a well established set of “generic 
facts” (i.e., those stemming from standard economic theory) weigh heavily against 
the complaint.  Epstein, 2011 (1) U Ill L Rev at 196–97 (cited in note 129).
184 See Twombly, 550 US at 544 (section III of the opinion), and Anderson and 
Huffman, 20 Cornell J L & Public Policy at 18–19 (cited in note 182).
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tual plausibility, plus the latter case-external concern, show that, 
from the antitrust perspective, Twombly may well be viewed as the 
continuation of the Monsanto—Matsushita—Brooke sequence.
I X .  a  G a m e  S a V e r ?
In the previous Sections we have offered three possible explanations 
for Brooke. Yet, regardless of whether the decision should be seen 
as a manifestation of the triumph of Chicago School price theory, as 
an outcome of a Harvard-style concern for administratively feasible 
rules, as an application of the Monsanto/Matsushita principle of rea-
sonable inferences—or probably as the result of all of the three com-
bined—the fact remains that since 1993 no plaintiff has ever won a 
PP case at federal court level.185 This is highly significant given the 
recent trend in US antitrust courts to favour standards over rules,186 
although the Brooke principle itself may not be depicted as purely 
rule-like, but rather as a combination of a rule-like part (the price-
cost rule) and a standard-like part (the recoupment test, entailing a 
structural analysis).
Yet, a few Industrial Organization (IO) economists did not let 
Brooke go unchallenged. What they could not accept was the Su-
preme Court’s endorsement of Chicago-style price theory at a time 
when the game-theoretic approach was replacing it as the hard core 
of mainstream economics in general, and of modern IO in particular. 
Historically speaking, the critique was well taken. Indeed, it may be 
argued that even before the game-theoretic revolution Chicago price 
theory had never achieved the same status and success in econom-
ics that it has enjoyed in the courtrooms. According to leading IO 
economist Stephen Martin, economics in general, and industrial eco-
nomics in particular, never considered Chicago so-called “tight prior 
equilibrium method” and its implication, the static, non-strategic 
approach to competition, as mainstream. Far from representing the 
method of economic theory, Chicago economics has always been 
viewed by non-Chicagoans as an idiosyncratic version of the neo-
classical theory of perfectly competitive markets, of hardly any util-
ity in the analysis of imperfect competition and antitrust. Surely, 
185 Of particular import among recent decisions is the summary judgment against 
the Department of Justice in U S v AMR Corp, 335 F 3d 1109 (10th Cir 2003). The 
judgment came on account of the government’s inability to meet the requirements 
of Brooke. Moreover, the government’s reputation theory of predation was explicitly 
dismissed at district court level as “subjective and unverifiable”. See Crane, 64 Wash 
& Lee L Rev at 71 (cited in note 173); G Monti, EC Competition Law 72–73 (Cam-
bridge 2007).
186 Crane, 64 Wash & Lee L Rev (cited in note 173).
nicola Giocoli 319
since the mid-1980s, the advent and quick rise to dominance of 
game theory set the record straight in the marketplace of ideas: stra-
tegic reasoning has become the way of doing IO analysis. Still, in 
the last three decades most US antitrust courts have taken Chicago 
views as representative of the whole IO community. In the subfield 
of PP, and at the highest judicial level, this attitude is epitomized by 
the Brooke decision. 
In reaction to that attitude, a landmark paper by economists Pat-
rick Bolton and Michael Riordan, and law scholar Joseph Brodley, 
has tried to re-propose the case for the game-theoretic approach to 
PP in a way that could make it acceptable to US courts.187 The cen-
tral question is how to solve the tension between legal decisions, like 
Brooke, and the outcomes of modern economics. BBR correctly iden-
tify the main reason behind the judicial skepticism about PP in the 
assumption of perfect information underlying the kind of economic 
models which, more or less explicitly, courts seem to follow when 
deciding over predation charges.188 As we know, the assumption was 
typical of the static, non-strategic approach to PP that led the way 
until the late 1970s. According to BBR, US courts still adhere to this 
approach, wrongly believing that it still mirrors the economists’ con-
sensus. What these courts—including the Brooke Supreme Court—
seem to ignore is that such a consensus does not exist anymore (if it 
ever existed at all), because modern IO models are, at the same time, 
more sophisticated and more realistic in that they assume imperfect 
information and build around it plausible predation stories based on 
strategic and intertemporal considerations.189 
Consistently with this view, BBR offer a new, more general and 
strategic-oriented definition of PP as “a price reduction that is prof-
itable only because of the added market power the predator gains 
from eliminating, disciplining or otherwise inhibiting the competi-
tive conduct of a rival or potential rival. [. . .] a predatory price is a 
price that is profit-maximizing only because of its exclusionary or 
other anti-competitive effects.”190 Yet, they also admit that this and 
similarly economics-based definitions are not operational in terms 
187 S. Martin, Remembrance of Third Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Develop-
ment of Industrial Economics, 282 Contributions in Econ Analysis 25(2007). Bolton 
et al, 88 Georgetown L J at 2255–56 (cited in note 23) (BBR henceforth).
188 Id at 2249.
189 Id. Note once more the emphasis on the higher realism of game-theoretic mod-
els of PP—hardly an innocuous claim if only we consider the kind of rationality 
requirements agents in those games are assumed to possess and apply. See above, 
section 6. 
190 Id at 2242–43.
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of applicable legal rules. Hence, they propose a five-step approach 
that aims at being, at the same time, i) faithful to modern IO eco-
nomics, ii) consistent with Brooke doctrine, and iii) fully operational 
in the courts. 
Following Joskow and Klevorick’s 1979 article191, the five steps 
are divided in two tiers. The first tier, which operates as a screen-
ing device, contains three steps: 1) prove the existence of a mar-
ket structure facilitating PP, 2) prove the plausibility of a preda-
tion scheme, 3) prove the probability of recoupment. Only when 
the first-tier scrutiny has given positive answers to all of the three 
steps, the court should move to the second tier, which requires more 
exacting proofs: 4) prove that price is below cost, 5) prove there is no 
efficiency defense justifying the predator’s behavior.192 The advan-
tage of a two-tiered approach is that, in the same spirit of Brooke, it 
allows cases to be eliminated via the examination of less resource-
consuming factors, i.e., before requiring expensive evidence for the 
firm’s costs or its efficiency justifications. Moreover, the three steps 
in the first tier are consistent with the necessary conditions for a PP 
trial established by the Brooke Court.193 
The most important steps for us are the second and the third. 
According to Brooke, to prove PP and recoupment, the plaintiff must 
show that predation is plausible ex ante and probable ex post, see 
above, Section 6. BBR argue that ex ante plausibility may be dem-
onstrated by proving the existence of a predatory scheme, i.e., by 
giving enough evidence supporting a credible story of predation.194 
But, where can the plaintiff look for such a story? BBR’s answer is 
straightforward: modern game theory has provided a whole play-
book of possible predatory schemes. Hence, a plaintiff providing evi-
dence in support of one of those strategic stories could legitimately 
claim that her argument rests on the rigorous foundations of main-
stream economics.195 As to ex post probability, BBR argue that it 
may be maintained by proving either that one or more rivals have 
191 Joskow and Klevorick, 89(2) Yale L J at 213–270 (cited in note 40).
192 Defendants would obviously bear the burden of proof in this last step.
193 Bolton et al, 88 Georgetown L J at 2264 (cited in note 23).
194 This is in the same spirit of Thomas Kauper’s “could test”: go on with the trial 
in search of facts only when economic harm could possibly occur, i.e., only when 
a plausible, theoretically-sound story exists to explain it. T E Kauper, Antitrust in 
1992: The Year of the Storyteller, 61 Antitrust L J 347, 348–49 (1993).  Yet, it is debat-
able whether any game-theoretic story of PP may satisfy the Monsanto-Matsushita 
“tends to exclude” principle as well as the Twombly rule (see above at Section 8.2). 
More on this below, Section 10.
195 Bolton et al, 88 Georgetown L J at 2266–67 (cited in note 23).
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been excluded from the market or at least that post-predation mar-
ket conditions exist that make future recoupment likely. In order to 
prove the latter, BBR suggest a cost standard, like Baumol’s AIC, or 
Joskow and Klevorick’s AAC.196 
The philosophy behind BBR’s proposal is clear. The only way to 
reconcile modern economics with current legal doctrine is to go 
back to a rule of reason approach, yet policed by a cost rule.197 The 
element of novelty comes in the way rule of reason analysis should 
be undertaken. Rather than chasing evidence about the ambiguous 
notion of predatory intent, the analysis should be guided by, and 
search for, the elements of one of the PP stories told in the game-
theoretic literature. This would capture what the authors consider a 
peculiarity of predation as an antitrust violation, namely, its being 
too multi-faceted a phenomenon to be identified by a single factor or 
behavior (say, a single cost rule). In the spirit of Schmalensee’s 1979 
contribution198, they plead for a case-by-case analysis, capable every 
time of selecting the particular economic model that happens to fit 
the factual circumstances of the specific case.199
Note however that, as Milgrom and Roberts before them, BBR 
also err by identifying McGee’s 1958 article as the theoretical pillar 
of the exceedingly lenient, if not entirely laissez faire, approach fol-
lowed by US antitrust courts in PP cases: “For a long time, McGee’s 
analysis provided the only coherent economic theory of predatory 
pricing. While some resisted McGee’s conclusion that predatory 
pricing was irrational, no rival theory emerged.”200 This statement 
is clearly instrumental to BBR’s thesis that the real problem behind 
so many pro-defendant decisions is strictly theoretical and that this 
problem may be solved only by summoning in the courtrooms a bet-
ter kind of theory, namely, game theory. But we already know that, 
far from ever being “for a long time” the “only coherent economic 
theory” of PP, McGee’s analysis was even less accepted by the courts, 
that almost completely ignored it. BBR themselves betray their own 
statement, as they claim that what they call “the populist era of pred-
196 Id at 2271–72. Therefore, as far as the recoupment step is concerned, BBR’s 
proposal brings us back to the old price-cost stuff. One may legitimately wonder how 
to reconcile this aspect of their proposal with AIG’s strong claim that predator’s costs 
have no relation whatsoever with the profitability of predation (or, for that matter, 
with their own claim that one of the weakest aspects of Brooke was the absence of 
any strategic, not cost-based view of recoupment).
197 Again the analogy with Joskow and Klevorick is apparent. Joskow and Klevorick, 
89(2) Yale L J at 213–270 (cited in note 40).
198 Schmalensee, 127(4) U Pa L Rev at 994–1050 (cited in note 40).
199 Bolton et al, 88 Georgetown L J at 2252 (cited in note 23).
200 Id at 2244.
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atory pricing enforcement” ended abruptly not because of McGee’s 
paper, but rather because of Areeda and Turner in 1975.201 Given the 
Harvard affiliation of both Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner, it is 
rather curious that BBR attribute them the triumph of Chicago price 
theory in the courts.
More than a historical quibble is at stake here. By emphasizing 
the purely theoretical foundations of the mistaken doctrine followed 
by post-1975 courts, BBR seem to neglect the main reason behind 
ATR’s success, namely, its being a simple and fully operational rule. 
In other words, that it was not McGee, but rather Areeda and Turner 
who really turned the tables in PP enforcement, did not depend on 
analytical issues—or, for what it’s worth, on the Chicago vs. Har-
vard controversy—but first and foremost on the courts’ eagerness to 
adopt a bright-line rule capable of restoring the credibility of anti-
trust enforcement, after so many years of discredited PP jurispru-
dence. In this respect, the Brooke doctrine simply put an authorita-
tive—and long overdue—seal upon a well established attitude. 
The implications of BBR’s incomplete reconstruction are severe. 
If the real motivation behind the new post-1975 attitude of US courts 
was practical, rather than theoretical, doubts may be raised about 
the concrete chances of BBR’s appeal to the “right” theory—i.e., 
AIG—to  persuade courts to modify their approach. If what judges 
and juries long for are simple, ready-to-use rules, any proposal call-
ing for a return to fully-fledged rule of reason analysis, including 
the necessity to trace the evidence supporting complicated stories 
of strategic predation, is condemned to irrelevance regardless of its 
own theoretical merits. This kind of mistake has frequently spoiled 
the PP literature. For example, we know that some of the critics of 
ATR committed it, though others did not (see above, Sections 3.2 – 3). 
It is the same mistake made by the early generation of AIG theorists, 
though again more acute authors like Milgrom and Roberts were 
somehow aware of it (see above, Section 6). Above all, it is the very 
mistake that most clearly accounts for the failure of game theory to 
have any effective influence upon PP legal doctrine. It wouldn’t take 
long for the critics of the game-theoretic approach to IO and preda-
tion to point this out.
X .  J U d G e S  d o n ’ t  P l a y – S h o U l d  t h e y ?
The reaction to BBR’s proposal was almost immediate. University 
of Virginia economists Kenneth Elzinga and David Mills penned a 
spicy reply where they declared that: “Although strategic theories of 
201 Id at 2250.
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predatory pricing are exemplary in their coherence and rigor, their 
potential to add value to antitrust policy is much more modest than 
[BBR] admit.”202 What game theorists have achieved, they explained, 
is to identify sufficient conditions for complete and internally con-
sistent stories to elucidate why a rational firm endowed with mo-
nopoly power may profitably undertake PP. But this means that 
the strategic approach is complementary, rather than alternative, 
to standard price theory. No author working in the latter tradition 
has ever argued that PP is always irrational, but only that the condi-
tions making it a profitable business strategy are quite improbable, 
as well as that the means to detect this kind of violation would be 
overtly expensive and difficult to apply.203 
It is true that game theory does manage to reformulate some of 
the existing loose stories of PP and give them more consistency and 
plausibility. Yet, the predictions stemming from such reformula-
tions are far too sensitive to the underlying assumptions. As Elzinga 
and Mills put it, the new PP stories may apply only to “factual situ-
ations that fit the theory’s stringent requirements.”204 Hence, we are 
back to step one, because in order to apply these stories, courts need 
to first prove facts supporting them. For example, a court would have 
to first show that the asymmetry in either information or financial 
resources—necessary for a dominant firm to prey upon the rival by 
successfully muddling its beliefs—actually exists in the evidence. 
But this is exactly what price theorists have always conceded (e.g., 
the deep pocket story). 
Strategic stories only make things worse in this respect. Firstly, 
because they impose a higher standard of judging given the intrin-
sic fragility of their prescriptions (just think of how game equilib-
ria may drastically vary as a consequence of slight variations in 
the assumptions). BBR simply fail to “acknowledge that proving 
a more demanding theory calls for a more discriminating factual 
inquiry.”205 Secondly, because the key assumption of many of these 
models which must be empirically proven, namely, the informa-
tional asymmetry (the “incumbent-know-best assumption”, as El-
zinga and Mills call it), is actually unobservable or unverifiable.206 
202 K G Elzinga and D E Mills, Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory, 89 George-
town L Rev 2475 (2001).
203 Id at 2476.
204 Id at  2477.
205 Id at 2475.
206 Id at 2478. However, Elzinga & Mills, recognize that other game-theoretic mod-
els exist where equilibrium predation may ensue without assuming any asymmetry at 
all. See for example the learning curve model by L Cabral and M Riordan, The Learn-
ing Curve, Predation, Antitrust, and Welfare, 45 (2) J  Indus Econ, 155–169 (1997). 
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Thirdly, one should also be skeptical about the overly simplified 
market structure underlying all game-theoretic models of PP, where 
the asymmetry between firms is magnified ad hoc. Again, while a 
PP story may well be plausible in a stylized market, it may not nec-
essarily be so in more complex settings, closer to the real world.207 
BBR’s proposal also looks questionable from the procedural side. 
According to its supporters, a plausible game-theoretic story, sup-
ported by some ex ante evidence on market structure and the likes, 
should suffice to prove predation in a court, with little if any role left 
for ex post—i.e., after the price cut—evidence. Yet, one might legiti-
mately wonder what BBR would suggest when the market structure 
and performance do not fit ex post the ex ante inferences of injury to 
competition. This, according to Elzinga and Mills, is actually what 
happened in crucial cases, where either the FTC’s or the Supreme 
Court’s cautious behavior with respect to PP allegations, has been 
vindicated by ex post market developments.208 Among these cases 
features “the poster child for the game theoretic approach” to preda-
tion, i.e., the 1984 General Foods coffee case209 where ex post data 
clearly showed that “had game theoretic interpretations persuaded 
the FTC to restrain [General Foods]’s aggressive pricing, coffee drink-
ers and competition would have been injured, not the other way 
round.”210 
Elzinga and Mills conclude that the prescriptions stemming from 
the game-theoretic approach have no general analytical value and 
little practical usage: “Strategic theories of predatory pricing are 
pristine theoretical existence proofs. Their value lies in identify-
ing sufficient theoretical conditions for predatory pricing to arise as 
an equilibrium outcome.”211 The new models answer the question: 
“When, as a matter of economic theory, can predatory pricing oc-
cur?”, but this is not the relevant question antitrust courts have to 
answer—the latter actually being, firstly, “Under market conditions 
actually observed, is predatory pricing the most plausible explana-
tion for an episode of low prices?”, and, secondly, “Are these condi-
tions distinguishable from legitimate competition in the market?”212 
As these questions clearly show, enforcement of PP law is a practi-
cal issue of “is”, not the theoretical issue of “can”.
207 Id.
208 Id at 2486.
209 General Foods Corp, 103 FTC 204 (1984). The case is taken as exemplary by 
both Bolton et al, 88 Georgetown L J at 2255–56 (cited in note 23) and Milgrom and 
Roberts, 27 J Econ Theory at 280–312 (cited at note 91).
210 Elzinga and Mills, 89 Georgetown L Rev at 2489 (cited at note 202).
211 Id at 2493–94.
212 Id at 2479.
We devoted so much room to Elzinga and Mills’s paper because 
it is exemplary of the empirical and theoretical objections raised by 
economists and law scholars against the strategic approach to PP. 
Their critique concerning the unobservability or unverifiability of 
the crucial “incumbent-know-best” assumption aptly summarizes 
the doubts raised in the literature about the alleged higher realism of 
game-theoretic models with respect to price-theoretic ones. Other 
examples in this vein213 are the scepticism about the heavy burden 
of rationality required for firms to calculate their equilibrium strat-
egies or the concern about the extreme fragility of the equilibrium 
itself, symbolized by the Folk Theorem for AIG (see Section 6). The 
theorem’s thesis that there always exists a context (formally, a set 
of beliefs) supporting a given equilibrium—say, a predatory one—
makes the whole approach too ad hoc and therefore hardly accept-
able in courtrooms.
To reiterate the point, game theory cannot suggest the certainty, 
or even the plausibility, of a certain outcome, but just its  logical  pos-
sibility.214 As Sam Peltzam noted when reviewing the 1989 Hand-
book of Industrial Organization, what game-theoretic IO mod-
els amount to is “an almost interminable series of special cases”, 
whose conclusions “tend to be very sensitive to the way problems 
are defined and to the assumptions that follow.”215 This is a boon 
in view of the freedom and flexibility it grants to researchers, but 
an indictment in terms of actual courtroom applicability. The very 
same flexibility of strategic models that lies behind their enormous 
success in modern academic IO makes them less apt to produce 
robust predictions, and thus, eventually explains their inability to 
influence antitrust courts.216 
213 Recall that these objections were first raised by Milgrom and Roberts them-
selves: see above, Section 6.
214 Also see B H Kobayashi, Game Theory and Antitrust: A Post-Mortem, 5 GMU 
L Rev 411, 418–19 (1997).  That modern economic models too often amount to sheer 
“possibility proofs”, i.e., non-constructive arguments showing just the logical pos-
sibility of a certain outcome, is a problem that goes well beyond the boundaries of 
IO, let alone PP theory. This is not the proper place to investigate more deeply such 
a delicate issue but see, in a similar vein, N Giocoli, In the Sign of the Axiomatic 
Method: Mathematics as the Role Model for Neoclassical Economics (Blanqui Lec-
ture), 144 – 45 in R Arena, S Dow and M Klaes, eds, Open Economics: Economics in 
Relation to Other Disciplines, 127–147 (2009).
215 S Peltzman, The Handbook of Industrial Organization: A Review Article, 99(1) 
J Pol Econ 201, 206 (1991). 
216 Kovacic and Shapiro note that the only way a court can tell whether in a given 
case a certain business behavior is welfare improving or welfare reducing is to con-
duct a fully-fledged rule of reason analysis—hardly a progress with respect to what 
1960s antitrust practitioners already knew. W E Kovacic and C Shapiro, Antitrust 
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The move from classrooms to courtrooms is particularly trouble-
some in the case of imperfect or incomplete information models, 
like AIG ones, which require some structure on the beliefs of the 
market participants. There is a whole set of stories an antitrust econ-
omist may always tell in her court testimony, each corresponding 
to a specific belief structure of the competing firms, with little or no 
factual element to pick the “right” one for the case at hand. Starting 
from rough details of the firms’ behavior, AIG models yield many 
potential equilibrium outcomes, with no clear way to choose among 
them. Thus, even the most basic antitrust issues have no clear out-
come in a Post-Chicago model. Anything goes in the AIG world.217
X I .   c o n c l U S I o n :  l a w  I S  n o t  
a  P l a y G r o U n d
In a 1989 article,218 MIT economist Franklin Fisher distinguished be-
tween generalizing and exemplifying theories. The former are those 
which proceed from wide assumptions to inevitable consequences 
and that speak in terms of what must happen given the background 
circumstances; the latter are those which focus on determining what 
can happen and are highly sensitive to the assumptions used.219 As 
Fisher himself recognized, oligopoly theory belongs to the exempli-
Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14(1) J Econ Perspectives 43–60, 
55 (2000).
217 The chances that such a world might fare well within the US antitrust sys-
tem—little as they were—have been further decreased by the same Supreme Court 
that delivered the Brooke decision. In the famous Daubert case the Court established 
the principle that to be admitted in court an expert testimony must be not only “rel-
evant”, but also “reliable”. Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm Inc, 509 US 579 (1993). 
The doctrine—which applies to any kind of scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge, including economic knowledge—has significantly restricted the scope 
for expert testimony, entitling courts to a gate-keeping function with respect to the 
admission of scientific experts. According to Coate and Fischer, Daubert has doomed 
the Post-Chicago approach because it has made courts very skeptical about game- 
theoretic claims when no further evidence is provided relating the challenged con-
duct to actual market facts or when those facts are indistinguishable from the results 
of pro-competitive behavior. M B Coate and J H Fischer, Can Post-Chicago Econom-
ics Survive Daubert?, 34(4) Akron L Rev, 795–852 (2011). Langenfeld and Alexander 
offer some data on the “survival rate” of economists’ expert testimonies in anti-
trust cases following a Daubert challenge. J Langenfeld and C Alexander, Daubert 
Challenges of Antitrust Experts, AAI Working Paper, American Antitrust Institute, 
n.08/06 (2008).
218 A mini-classic whose relevance is hard to underestimate (this paper’s title is a 
tribute to it).
219 F M Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 (1) RAND J 
Econ 113–124, 117 (1989).
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fying category; a lot of different things may happen in an oligopoly 
model and there is no full theory of what must happen given well-
defined and measurable circumstances. Hence, he argued that oli-
gopoly theory was simply a collection of “a large number of stories, 
each one an anecdote describing what might happen in some par-
ticular situation.”220 Fisher added that the advent of game theory 
had only made things worse in this respect, because the only gener-
alizing result had been a negative one, namely, the Folk Theorem, 
which “tells us that we cannot hope for a general oligopoly theory 
based only on cost and demand functions and free of the context in 
which oligopolists operate.”221 
In the light of Fisher’s distinction, and of our analysis in the previ-
ous Sections, it turns out that the answers to the three basic ques-
tions of PP—does it exist theoretically? is it profitable? is it real? 
(see Introduction)—provided by the Post-Chicago game-theoretic ap-
proach are unable to achieve the status of a generalizing theory, i.e., 
of the only kind of theory that may find hearing in a US antitrust 
court, especially after Brooke.222 Therefore, we may claim that the 
real motivation for the courtroom failure of strategic models of PP 
is to be found in the irredeemable inconsistency between the exem-
plifying theories proposed by contemporary IO economists and the 
kind of arguments considered acceptable by judges or juries. No 
amount of rigorous theorizing showing the profitability of preda-
tory behavior, nor the empirical observation of successful predatory 
episodes, have managed to modify the legal response to PP, which 
has remained faithful to the operational imperative of a relatively 
administrable “bright line” rule, provided of course the rule itself 
be based on—to borrow the Supreme Court’s famous Daubert dic-
tum—“relevant and reliable science”. What the Supreme Court did 
in its 1993 Brooke decision was therefore not to provide any sophis-
ticated yardstick for assessing PP, but rather to proclaim the inher-
ent difficulty and imprecision of any such assessment, and with it 
the dubious scientific status of any theoretical claim supporting the 
existence and profitability of predatory behavior.
It is now customary to place Brooke within the Supreme Court’s 
more general drive, going on throughout the 1990s and still continu-
ing today, to “fix the Court’s antitrust” by realigning its doctrine to 
the findings of modern IO.223 According to the standard narrative, the 
220  Id at 118.
221 Id.
222 And Daubert and, more recently, Twombly.
223 On this general trend see E Elhauge,  Harvard, not Chicago: Which Antitrust 
School Drives Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 32 (2) Competition Policy Int 159 
(2007); Werden, 5(1) J of Competition L & Econ at 49–74 (cited in note 20).
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strategic turn of IO, with the rise of the Post-Chicago approach, has 
been the inevitable reaction from those economists who, against the 
courtroom triumph of the laissez faire Chicago approach, employed 
game theory to rescue and, at the same time, strengthen with more 
rigorous foundations some of the old Harvard antitrust mantra pro-
hibiting several of the most typical conducts by dominant firms. 
In this story, the Brooke decision would simply be representative 
of all those courts that still stick to Chicago price theory, unaware 
that this approach has long lost its central status within mainstream 
economics. 
As I have attempted to show, this reconstruction is plausible, 
but at best incomplete. To begin with, asking whether the Brooke 
Court was following Harvard or Chicago is a false problem—or, if 
you like, a trivial one, since the only correct answer is “both”. This 
because both approaches entail faithfulness to the simple rule-based 
view of antitrust enforcement in general, and of PP enforcement in 
particular. It is standard price theory, the common ground of both 
approaches, which imposes adherence to this view. On the contrary, 
game-theoretic IO points in the opposite direction, i.e., away from 
simple, mechanical rules and back to a story-based assessment of 
every predatory case. Hence, the real dichotomy that should be 
investigated is not Harvard versus Chicago, but rather rules versus 
stories.224
 Once the terms of the question have been properly identified, we 
may explain why, starting from the mid-1970s, most US antitrust 
courts, and principally the Supreme Court, have expressed a clear 
preference for a rule-based approach to predation cases, thereby kill-
ing any concrete chance for the game-theoretic methodology to gain 
any hearing in the courtroom. The history of PP law and econom-
ics shows that, at the end of the day, it is the legal argument—rec-
tius, the legal attitude with respect to a certain way of presenting 
an argument—which prevails, rather than the rigor or elegance of one 
economic theory to another. Quoting Tom’s 1997 article: “The out-
comes of particular formal models may be less important than the 
tendency of the game-theoretic perspective to reinforce the litiga-
tor’s traditional emphasis on ‘the story’ at the expense of the appel-
late judge’s traditional emphasis on ‘the rule’ ”,225 and it goes without 
saying which of the two emphases is destined to prevail in court-
rooms.
224 See Crane for a general assessment of this dichotomy. Crane, 64 Wash & Lee L 
Rev at 49–110 (cited in note 173).  Note that the “safe harbors” approach, a hallmark 
of Chicago antitrust, is just a different name for a pro-defendant, rule-based approach.
225 W K Tom, Game Theory in the Everyday like of the Antitrust Practitioner, 
5 GMU L 457– 469 (1997).
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As to the reason why courts may prefer simple rules to more flex-
ible, but also more complicated, stories, it is apt to go back to Brey-
er’s 1990 dictum in Town of Concord: “We shall take into account 
of the institutional fact that antitrust rules are court-administered 
rules. They must be clear enough for lawyers to explain them to cli-
ents. They must be administratively workable and therefore cannot 
always take account of every complex economic circumstance or 
qualification.”226 The price for being consistent with such an obvi-
ous truth has been that, as an authoritative commentator and former 
FTC associate director put it, “[i]n the one area in which economists’ 
game-theoretic approaches seemingly offered new possibilities for 
plaintiff victories—predatory pricing—the post-Chicago approach 
has failed to deliver.”227 A very low price, at least for antitrust judges 
and juries. Indeed, so low that it has allowed the Chicago predator to 
defend its leadership in the US courtroom “market” at the expense 
of the Post-Chicago prey.
226 Town of Concord v Boston Edison Co, 915 F2d 17, 22 (1st Cir 1990).
227 McChesney, 27 (3) Regulation at 51 (cited at note 120).
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